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Breaking Up is Hard to do: Developments in 
Partitioning Real and Personal Property in 
Marital, Business, and Personal 
Relationships in Florida Jurisprudence 
Harry M. Hipler* 
This article focuses on partition of real and personal property in 
Florida in the 21st century.  It discusses questions and issues 
about partitioning real and personal property, so that private 
lawyers who practice in a variety of areas can familiarize 
themselves with how partition proceedings work.  Partition of 
real and personal property is not restricted to one area of the 
law.  Instead, it relates to and bleeds over into a multitude of 
areas of the law making it necessary for all practitioners to be 
familiar with the area of partition.  Partition is now provided in 
all 50 states, and Florida’s partition law is regulated by Chapter 
64, Florida Statutes.  Partition may seem simple and straight 
forward for the purpose of dividing jointly owned real and 
personal property, nonetheless the partition process can be 
cumbersome, unpredictable, and confusing.  When joint owners 
of real and personal property – whether they are married, 
unmarried live-in companions, cotenants as business partners 
and shareholders, or beneficiaries of real and personal property 
– come to a decision to part ways they often find that breaking 
up their undivided interests is hard to do. Today’s lawyers’ will 
come in contact with disputes regarding joint ownership of real 
and personal property especially on account of an improving 
economy.  Cotenants are no longer reluctant to divide and sell 
their real property on account of the increased value of their 
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jointly held real property in light of a growing and stronger 
economy.    
This article discusses issues pertaining to partition, including the 
following:  stating a cause of action for partition and whether 
property is divisible or indivisible; exceptions to mandatory 
partition; what is property according to Chapter 64, Florida 
Statutes; treatment of a deposit and down payment when 
purchasing jointly titled real property; applicability of the 
statute of limitations to a partition actions; maximizing interests 
in real and personal property partition actions and the 
importance of a written agreement upon separation; contractual 
and statutory provisions for entitlement to attorney fees; other 
causes of actions that may be consolidated in a partition 
proceeding;  personal and constructive service of process;  when 
does jointly titled property vest in a cotenant upon death of an 
cotenant;  setoffs and credits in jointly titled marital residence; 
the benefits and burdens of cotenants of jointly own real and 
personal property; homestead property and forced sale in 
partition; “ouster” of one cotenant and the effect of ouster on 
setoffs and credits; nonexistent and void ab initio marriage and 
its effect on joint ownership in partition; effect of Obergefell v. 
Hodges and same-sex marriage on partition.   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
When joint owners of real and personal property—whether they are 
married, unmarried live-in companions, cotenants as business partners 
and shareholders, or beneficiaries of real and personal property—come to 
a decision to part ways, they often find that breaking up their undivided 
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interests is hard to do.1 Partition—the legal procedure in which joint 
owners break up their undivided joint ownership in real and personal 
property—has roots dating back to Roman law, where cotenants were 
permitted to partition and sell jointly-held land.2 An action for partition 
of land is an ancient common law remedy that was initially established to 
allow cotenants to divide land held jointly.3 In England, the process 
through which joint owners broke up their undivided ownership dates 
back to thirteenth century England during the reign of Henry III and 
applied to land held as joint tenants and tenants in common.4 Although 
partition existed during England’s feudal period, it was limited and not 
available to most.5 In 1539, during the reign of Henry VIII, partition 
developed to all forms of joint ownership except tenancies by the 
entireties.6 Partition is now provided for in all 50 states of the United 
States,7 and in Florida, it is regulated by Chapter 64 of the Florida 
Statutes.8 Partition seems like a simple and straightforward concept and 
procedure for the purpose of dividing jointly owned real and personal 
property, yet the partition process can be cumbersome, unpredictable, 
and confusing. 
This article focuses on partition of real and personal property in 
Florida in the 21st century and discusses issues in the procedure so that 
private lawyers practicing in different areas of the law can become 
familiar with how partition proceedings work. Partition of real and 
personal property is not boxed into one area of the law. Rather, it is a 
part of many areas of the law including, but not limited to: family 
                                                                                                             
1 Neil Sedaka, Breaking Up Is Hard to Do (1962); Neil Sedaka, Breaking Up is Hard 
to Do (Rocket Records 1972). “Breaking Up is Hard to Do” is a song recorded by Neil 
Sedaka, and co-written by Sedaka and Howard Greenfield. Sedaka recorded this song 
twice, in 1962 and 1975, in two extremely different arrangements, and is considered to be 
his signature song. 
2 See Jonathan I. Charney, Partition in the Modern Context, 1967 WIS. L REV. 988, 
988 (1967);William H. Loyd, Partition, 67 U. PA. L. REV. 162, 163 (1919). 
3 See Garcia-Tunon v. Garcia-Tunon, 472 So. 2d 1378, 1379 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985). 
4 A.C. Freeman, Cotenancy and Partition: A Treatise on the Law of Co-Ownership as 
it Exists Independent of Partnership Relations Between the Co-Owners (S. Whitney & 
Co.) (1874); William H. Loyd, Partition, 67 U. PA.L. REV. 162 (1919); Robert Ludlow 
Fowler, Novel Partition Procedure, 3 COLUM. L. REV. (1903). 
5 Id. 
6 William H. Loyd, Partition, 67 U. PA.L. REV. 162 (1919); Robert Ludlow Fowler, 
Novel Partition Procedure, 3 COLUM. L. REV. (1903). 
7 See Ark Land Co. v. Harper, 599 S.E. 2d 754, 758 (W. Va. 2004) (citing Phyliss 
Craig-Taylor, Through a Colored Looking Glass:A View of Judicial Partition, Family 
Land Loss, and Rule Setting, 78 Wash. U.L.Q. 737, 752 (2002)) ; Crystal Chastain Baker 
and Shunta Vincent McBride, A Primer on Heirs Property and Georgia’s New Uniform 
Partition of Heirs Property Act: Protecting Owners of Heirs Property, 19 GA. BAR J. 16, 
18 (Oct. 2013). 
8 FLA. STAT. §§ 64.011 – 64.091 (2015). 
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disputes in dissolution of marriage proceedings; real estate (land and 
property ownership, residential and commercial transactions, and 
contract creation and interpretation); legal ownership interests in real and 
personal property; landlord-tenant; estate planning (wills, trusts, 
inheritance, and probate); elder law; mineral and agricultural rights; 
judgment liens and collections; title insurance disputes; business 
associations and corporations; tax; and of course, general civil litigation. 
Partition bleeds over to a multitude of areas of the law, making it 
necessary to become familiar with partition proceedings and issues. This 
familiarity becomes even more necessary on account of a high volume of 
disputes occurring among families and non-families alike when cotenants 
decide to divide and sell their real and personal property. 
II. STATING A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR PARTITION UNDER CHAPTER 64, 
FLORIDA STATUTES 
A. Chapter 64, Florida Statutes, requires two or more cotenants 
Where real or personal property is owned by two or more cotenants, 
Florida Statute Section 64.031 provides that a partition “action may be 
filed by any one or more of several joint tenants, tenants in common, or 
coparceners against the cotenants, coparceners, or others interested in the 
lands to be divided.”9 The names of the owners are important in 
determining whether a partition action may be filed by two or more 
cotenants, but even if only one name or title is listed as the owner of real 
and personal property, it is still possible to go behind the entity’s name 
and title in seeking a partition, at least as to a corporation. In Kay v. Key 
West Development Co., there were two stockholders who owned one-half 
of the capital stock.10 The owners took title in the name of the 
corporation that was formed and organized solely for the purpose of 
owning the real property.11 One stockholder and a beneficiary of a 
deceased stockholder’s estate could not agree upon a sale or division of 
the real property, resulting in a deadlock.12 The Florida Supreme Court 
ruled that the trial court may disregard the corporate entity and go behind 
the actual title, thereby allowing the stockholders to be treated as persons 
in interest permitting the real property to be divided and/or sold without 
destroying the legal existence of the corporation in a partition suit.13 
                                                                                                             
9 FLA. STAT. § 64.031 (2015). 
10 Kay v. Key West Development Co., 72 So. 2d 786 (Fla. 1954). 
11 Id. at 786. 
12 Id. at 787. 
13 Id. at 789. Had the real property been acquired as a tenancy in common, the remedy 
of partition would have still been available; the fact title was taken in a corporate name 
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If only one person or entity owns real or personal property, a 
partition action is not sustainable. Section 64.031 has codified the 
general rule that the partition statute does not apply to real and personal 
property owned by a single person or entity.14 In Shephard v. Ouellete,15 
the district court held that the partition statute did not provide a basis to 
order judicial sale of a partnership’s parcel of real property in a 
partnership dissolution proceeding since the parcel was owned solely by 
the partnership as a single entity.16 
A partition action is unavailable to the owner of a life estate applying 
for partition of real property against remaindermen, even where a 
cotenant shares an interest in the remainder interest.17 Remaindermen 
have no present possession during the existence of a particular estate, and 
are not entitled to partition, because the interests by the remaindermen 
are successive to the interests in the life estate.18 Similarly, “a tenant in 
common who has no immediate right to possession of property has no 
right to seek a partition[],” because in order to maintain a complaint for 
partition, the plaintiff must show title and an immediate right to 
possession.19 Thus, if legal title is not established in the plaintiff, 
                                                                                                             
should not preclude a similar result. The Florida Supreme Court in Kay ordered the sale 
of the corporation’s sole asset and the distribution of the sale proceeds to the shareholders 
by sustaining the use of the partition statute as a basis to order a sale. Id. See also 
Fernandez v. Yates, 145 So. 3d 141, 144-45 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014). The principle 
announced in Kay, however, does not extend to corporate officers or directors, but is 
confined to shareholders. See Perdomo v. Cabrera, 963 So. 2d 736, 736 (Fla. 3d DCA 
2007). 
14 FLA. STAT. § 64.031 (2015). 
15 Shephard v. Ouellete, 854 So. 2d 251 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003). 
16 Id. at 251-52. “The partition statute does not apply to property that is owned by a 
single entity. Because the property was owned solely by the partnership, a partition action 
did not lie.” Id. at 254. See also Buchman v. Canard, 926 So. 2d 390, 392 (Fla. 3d DCA 
2005). FLA. STAT. §689.045 (2016) (concerns conveyances to or by a partnership, and 
provides that title in a partnership “must be conveyed or encumbered in the partnership 
name,” by allowing one general partner to execute the document on behalf of the 
partnership. In both a general and limited partnership, “one of the general partners is 
authorized to execute and record . . . an affidavit stating the names of the general 
partners” that may be duly recorded in the county where the real property is located. 
Thus, it would appear that real and personal property placed in the name of the 
partnership is a partnership interest and constitutes partnership property.) See FLA. STAT. 
§ 620.8201 (2015) (specifically provides: “(1) A partnership is an entity distinct from its 
partners.”). FLA. STAT. § 620.8307(1) (2016) (provides that a partnership can “sue and be 
sued”). Thus, a partnership is a single entity. 
17 FLA. STAT. §64.031 (2015); Anderson v. Russell, 975 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 1st DCA 
2008); Garcia-Tunon v. Garcia-Tunon, 472 So. 2d 1378 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985); Barden v. 
Pappas, 532 So. 2d 707 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988). 
18 Garcia-Tunon, 472 So. 2d at 1379. 
19 Cannon v. Morris, 407 So. 2d 372, 373 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); Lambert v. Lambert, 
403 So. 2d 484, 484 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). 
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partition is not available even if the plaintiff might have an equitable 
interest in the land.20 Where a surviving sibling is granted a life estate by 
a will of jointly held tenants in common real property, there is no right to 
seek partition until the life estate terminates.21 A life tenant in the entire 
real property lacks any present joint interest with any other person, which 
makes partition untenable.22 Interests that are successive and not 
concurrent cannot be partitioned.23 
B. Property indivisible and not subject to partition without 
prejudice to the owners, or property divisible subject to partition without 
prejudice to the owners 
Where a request for partition complies with Chapter 64 of the Florida 
Statutes and is uncontested by the opposing party, the property is 
indivisible and not subject to partition without prejudice to the others; the 
failure to grant partition, divide the property, and order a sale in 
accordance with the parties’ interests and, more specifically, Florida 
Statute Section 64.041, constitutes reversible error, as partition is a 
matter of right.24 Chapter 64 provides strict guidelines for partition and, 
if this statute is not followed, a district court has the authority to reverse 
the trial court’s proceedings.25 On the other hand, if the property is 
divisible without prejudice to the owners, a partition in kind is justified 
so that the property apportioned to the parties will be divided in 
accordance with the owners’ interests without a sale.26 
In either event, a trial court is authorized to decide whether real 
property is divisible or indivisible without appointing commissioners as 
                                                                                                             
20 Rountree v. Rountree, 101 So. 2d 43, 44 (Fla. 1958); Dietrich v. Winters, 798 So. 2d 
864, 866 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). 
21 Chin v. Estate of Chin, 15 So. 3d 894, 895 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009). 
22 Id. 
23 Barden v. Pappas, 532 So. 2d 707, 709 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988). 
24 FLA STAT. § 64.041 (2015); Pantuso v. Pantuso, 335 So. 2d 361, 362 (Fla. 2d DCA 
1976); Brennan v. Brennan, 122 So. 3d 923, 925-27 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013); Gulledge v. 
Gulledge, 82 So. 3d 1113, 1114-16 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012). Thus, if the trial court orders the 
sale of the marital home in the final judgment, the final judgment must fix a reasonable 
deadline for refinancing and by which the sale must take place if there is no refinancing, 
and if the final judgment fails to do so, then the district court is authorized to reverse. 
Marks v. Stein, 160 So. 3d 502 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015). See Blanchard v. Commonwealth 
Oil Co., 116 So. 2d 663, 668 (Fla. 3d DCA 1959) (suggesting that there must be ample 
allegations to support a partition proceeding, and without ample pleadings for partition, 
there cannot be a partition of property without following the requisite statutory 
procedure.), See Hodges v. Hodges, 128 So. 3d 190 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013); Watson v. 
Watson, 646 So. 2d 297, 297 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994). 
25 Marks 160 So. 3d 502 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015). 
26 Schroeder v. Lawhon, 922 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006). 
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provided by Florida Statute Section 64.061.27 In any partition 
proceeding, the parties must carefully follow Chapter 64 of the Florida 
Statutes or risk reversal if the procedure is found to be defective.28 The 
same rule applies where the trial court neglects to partition real property 
where one or both parties make a request: if the trial court leaves the 
partition count open without a deadline for division or sale, then the 
district court may reverse and remand to the trial court to correct such a 
deficiency.29 In such a situation, the district court is authorized to reverse 
the trial court’s ruling and remand the case to the trial court to partition 
the real property at a definite point in time for division or sale of the 
property.30 
C. Location matters: local vs. transitory actions 
Florida Statute Section 64.022 provides that “[p]artition shall be 
brought in any county where the lands or any part thereof lie . . . .”31 
There is a split among the appellate courts as to whether a court can 
compel the sale of real property or order a change in title for real 
property located outside the court’s geographical boundary. In local 
actions—where proceedings against the property have a fixed location—
the jurisdiction and venue lies only in the state and county where the 
subject real property is located.32 Under this view, the appellate courts 
have held that a trial court in a dissolution of marriage or partition action 
cannot sell or transfer real property located outside the territorial 
boundary of the court.33 Where the action is personal or transitory—an 
action on a debt, contract, dissolution of marriage, or other suit relating 
to a person—a defendant has the right to be sued in the county of his or 
her residence or where the cause of action arose.34 Under this view, a 
court has inherent jurisdiction to compel a sale of foreign real property 
located outside of the geographical boundary of the court as a part of its 
                                                                                                             
27 Geraci v. Geraci, 963 So. 2d 904, 906 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007). 
28 Marks, 160 So. 3d at 507-09. 
29 Kumar v. Kumar, 84 So. 3d 399 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012); Konz v. Konz, 63 So. 3d 845, 
846 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011); Collingsworth v. Collingsworth, 624 So. 2d 287, 290 (Fla. 1st 
DCA 1993). 
30 Brennan v. Brennan, 122 So. 3d 923, 925-27 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013); Gulledge v. 
Gulledge, 82 So. 3d 1113, 1114-17 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012); Pantuso v. Pantuso, 335 So. 2d 
361 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976). 
31 FLA. STAT. § 64.022 (2015). 
32 See Brown v. Brown, 169 So. 3d 286, 287 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015); Polkowski v. 
Polkowski, 854 So. 2d 286, 286-87 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003); Denison v. Denison, 658 So. 2d 
581, 582 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995); Harvey v. Mattes, 484 So. 2d 1382, 1383-84 (Fla. 5th 
DCA 1986). 
33 Id. 
34 Goedmakers v. Goedmakers, 520 So. 2d 575, 579 (Fla. 1988). 
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power to create an equitable distribution plan in a Final Judgment of 
Dissolution of Marriage.35 In Gil v. Mendelson,36 the district court held 
that the trial court could order the sale of Israeli real property, where the 
pleadings requested that the trial court take jurisdiction and equitably 
distribute all real and personal property of the parties.37 
III. EXCEPTIONS TO MANDATORY PARTITION OF JOINTLY TITLED REAL 
PROPERTY 
There are circumstances where a trial court can lawfully refuse to 
partition real property if the facts fall within one of the few exceptions of 
the parties’ right to partition. These exceptions include: where a grantor 
executes a deed in favor of a grantee conferring a life estate;38 a trial 
court grants exclusive use and occupancy to the former spouse and minor 
children until they turn age 18 or graduate from high school, whichever 
occurs later but not later than age 19;39 severe health reasons of a joint 
                                                                                                             
35 See Gil v. Mendelson, 870 So. 2d 825, 826 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003). The reasoning in 
Gil was that title and sale of the real property, other than the marital residence, were 
related to the dissolution of marriage action, which is a personal action of the parties. 
When the parties ask for equitable distribution in their pleadings, “pleadings filed by the 
parties invoke the trial court’s in personam jurisdiction to equitably distribute all property 
owned by the parties, regardless of the property’s location.” Id. 
36 Gil also suggests that the court has jurisdiction and authority to equitably distribute 
all of the parties property located in many different places because the parties have 
submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court. The Israeli real property in Gil was 
inextricably intertwined in the dissolution of marriage; therefore, it is difficult to separate 
the real property portion of the case from the equitable distribution portion. The district 
court also decided that entitlement to credits could be considered and applied against the 
former spouse’s one-half interest in the real property upon sale. 
37 Id. 
38 Kumar v. Kumar, 84 So. 3d 399 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012). Bucacci v. Boutin, 933 So. 2d 
580 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006). 
39 Phillips v. Phillips, 83 So. 3d 903, 904-05 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012); Durand v. Durand, 
16 So. 3d 982, 983 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009); Wiggins v. Wiggins, 415 So. 2d 861 (Fla. 5th 
DCA 1982). Contra Dottaviano v. Dottaviano, 170 So. 3d 98, 100 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015) 
(describing that the husband was made the primary residential parent of the parties minor 
son and granted exclusive use and occupancy of the home until majority or emancipation 
of the minor child. The wife asked for partition, but the trial court rejected her claim. On 
appeal, the district court reversed and ordered partition by ruling that “special 
circumstances” existed because the parties lacked other substantial marital assets, there 
was a large difference in relative earning power between the spouses, the family had 
lived in the marital home for a short period of time when they separated, the payments 
related to the marital home were substantial, and the husband could find a place for 
himself and the minor child to live that was less expensive. While the district court based 
its ruling on “special circumstances”, it would appear that a better reason for its ruling 
requiring partition of the marital residence is that in an equitable distribution design or 
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owner in a dissolution of marriage proceeding that forms a basis for an 
award of lump sum alimony;40 agreement by co-owners not to partition 
real property;41 trial court distributions where one marital asset is 
exchanged for another in an equitable distribution design or plan in a 
dissolution of marriage proceeding pursuant to Florida Statute Section 
61.075;42 and “manifest injustice” that should only be involved in 
extreme cases where fraud, oppression, unclean hands, or overreaching 
will result if partition were granted.43 However, for the most part, Florida 
appellate court decisions upholding partition and division or sale of real 
property suggest that partition is a matter of right in those persons 
holding an undivided interest in real property.44 Implicit in these 
decisions are strong policy reasons in favor of title passage. Partition and 
sale of the whole is beneficial to trade and commerce as it maximizes 
real estate’s aggregate value, whereas physical division without sale 
tends to provide for an inefficient fragmentation of real estate.45 Upon 
sale, title passes without any loss of economic value and with a minimum 
amount of dissention and inconvenience that can arise from the joint 
ownership and possession of real estate.46 
                                                                                                             
plan in a dissolution of marriage proceeding, a trial court pursuant to FLA. STAT. § 61.075 
(1) is authorized to divide the parties’ assets “to do equity between the parties.”). 
40 Durand, 16 So. 3d at 983. 
41 Condrey v. Condrey, 92 So. 2d 423, 426 (Fla. 1957); Haddad v. Hester, 964 So. 2d 
707 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (affirmed a trial court ruling where the parties were estopped 
and waived partition by creating a life estate in themselves and a remainder to the parties’ 
children. The Marital Settlement Agreement contained express language for both parties 
to keep the real property with the intention of passing it to the children. Green v. Green, 
16 So. 3d 298, 300 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (parties agreed to extend the time for exclusive 
use and occupancy of their child beyond majority age on account of a debilitating 
condition which caused her to remain dependent, and it was only after she died at age 27 
that the jointly owned property was subject to partition.). 
42 FLA. STAT. § 61.075 (2015); Green, 16 So. 3d at 299; Durand,16 So. 3d at 984. 
43 Condrey, 92 So. 2d at 427; Forehand v. Peacock, 77 So. 2d 625, 626 (Fla. 1955); 
Durand, 16 So. 3d at 984. 
44 Rose v. Hansell, 929 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006); Brennan v. Brennan, 122 So. 
3d 923, 925-27 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013); Gulledge v. Gulledge, 82 So. 3d 1113, 1114-17 
(Fla. 2d DCA 2012); Pantuso v. Pantuso, 335 So. 2d 361, 362 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976). 
45 See Thomas J. Miceli and C.F. Sirmans. Partition of Real Estate; Or, Breaking Up 
is (Not) Hard to Do,29 J. LEGAL STUD. 783 (2000); Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of 
Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163 (1999). 
46 See Brennan, 122 So. 3d at 926; Kumar v. Kumar, 84 So. 3d 399, 400 (Fla. 2d DCA 
2012); Barden v. Pappas, 532 So. 2d 707, 708 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988). These district court 
decisions among others emphasize that parties to dissolution of marriage or partition are 
entitled to a final resolution in the division and sale of joint assets at the conclusion of the 
proceedings. See also Harry M. Hipler, Partitioning Real Property in Dissolution of 
Marriage Actions and Suits Between Unmarried Cotenants: Credits, Setoffs, Ouster, 
Division, and Sale, 82 FLA. BAR J. 58 (2008). 
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IV. “PROPERTY” ACCORDING TO CHAPTER 64 OF THE FLORIDA 
STATUTES 
Most litigation concerning partition concerns real property between: 
spouses in dissolution of marriage actions; unmarried business owners; 
unmarried partners with or without children, who jointly own real 
property as tenants by the entireties (married); joint tenants with a right 
of survivorship (married and unmarried); or tenants in common (usually 
unmarried but there is nothing to prohibit married couples from owning 
property in this form).47 Yet, there is a question as to what constitutes 
“personal property” within the definition of the partition statute Florida 
Statute Section 64.091 provides that, “the laws applicable to partition and 
sale for partition of real estate are applicable to the partition and sale for 
partition of personal property and the proceedings therefor, as far as the 
nature of the property permits.”48 Personal property has been defined as 
tangible and intangible property belonging to an individual, excluding 
any real estate or other buildings.49 As long as the personal property is 
jointly owned, Florida courts have held that, for purposes of partition, 
personal property includes: a stallion owned by “syndication;”50 race 
horses;51 a registered thoroughbred colt;52 oil, gas, and other mineral 
rights in land,53 even where the surface rights to the land are not jointly 
owned;54 life insurance;55 and a purchase promissory note where 
                                                                                                             
47 See Tronconi v. Tronconi, 466 So. 2d 203, 206-07 (Fla 1985); Brandt v. Brandt, 525 
So. 2d 1017, 1020 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988); Hodges v. Hodges, 128 So. 3d 190 (Fla 5th 
DCA 2013); Gulledge, 82 So. 3d at 1114; Kumar, 84 So. 3d at 399; Coristine v. 
Coristine, 53 So. 3d 1204 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011). While married couples usually own real 
property as tenants by the entireties, there is nothing to prohibit them from owning 
property as tenants in common. Beal Bank, SSB v. Almand and Assoc., 780 So. 2d 45, 53 
(Fla. 2001). 
48 FLA. STAT. § 64.091 (2015).(stating “The laws applicable to partition and sale for 
partition of real estate are applicable to the partition and sale for partition of personal 
property and the proceedings therefor, as far as the nature of the property permits.”). 
Thus, partition should include tangible and intangible personal property. 
49 THE LAW DICTIONARY, http://thelawdictionary.org/personal-property/ (last visited 
Feb. 18, 2016). 
50 Reed v. Fink, 259 So. 2d 729 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972). 
51 Gambolati v. Sarkisian, 622 So. 2d 47, 49 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993). 
52 Occhuizzo v. Perlmutter, 426 So. 2d 1060, 1061 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). 
53 Rudman v. Baine, 133 So. 2d 760, 761 (Fla. 1st DCA 1961). Florida Statute Section 
715.06 was enacted in 1967 and amended in 1997 and allows the surface owner to 
explore and drill their real property subsurface for all minerals except oil, gas and sulphur 
without being liable to the owner of the minerals for damages. This statute, however, 
would appear to be no curb on a partition action on mineral rights, including oil, gas, and 
sulphur lying underneath the surface as they constitute personal property. FLA. STAT. 
§ 715.06 (2015). 
54 Id. 
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installment payments are received by two co-owners.56 Severed crops, 
logs, and oranges jointly owned may be regarded as personal property 
and subject to partition, unless they are specifically reserved or attached 
to the real estate, in which case they could be considered as part of the 
real property.57 Earth, sand, soil, and gravel existing as part of the land 
constitutes real property, whereas if those elements have been severed 
from the earth and secured for use elsewhere, they would constitute 
personal property as long as they are jointly owned.58 Jointly titled 
brokerage and bank accounts are forms of personal property and are 
subject to partition.59 A jointly titled stock and securities certificate is 
personal property subject to partition.60 
If a bank account is opened as a tenancy by the entireties, joint 
tenancy with right of survivorship, or tenants in common, the decision in 
Beal Bank SSB v. Almand and Associates61 suggests that such forms of 
ownership by cotenants constitute legally recognized forms of personal 
property ownership.62 While Beal Bank SSB discusses creditors’ 
collection rights as to jointly owned bank accounts, it was not a partition 
case; the decision provides that bank, brokerage, and securities accounts 
                                                                                                             
55 In Castro v. Hidalgo, the decedent owned four life insurance policies, but he named 
the natural children as beneficiaries in only one life insurance policy. Under the policy’s 
terms, if there was no designation of beneficiaries, it was the decedent who was the 
beneficiary by default. The natural children filed adversarial petitions in the probate 
proceeding against the stepmother by requesting that the probate court determine the 
beneficiaries, and after doing so. they asked that the trial court partition the life insurance 
policies as their personal property if they were named as the beneficiaries. The children 
suggested that since the beneficiary was silent, it had to be considered as intestate 
property, making them beneficiaries, whereas the stepmother argued that she was the 
beneficiary on account of Florida Statute Section 222.13(1). The trial court denied the 
son’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. The children appealed the denial, and the 
district court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The claims made in the trial 
court proceeding suggest that life insurance proceeds may be subject to partition of 
personal property. 
56 See Rosen v. Marlin, 486 So. 2d 623, 627-28 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986). 
57 See Simmons v. Williford, 53 So. 452 (Fla. 1910); Sanborn v. Franklin Cnty. 
Lumber Co., 46 So. 85 (Fla. 1908); Wright v. McGinley, 351 So. 2d 1151 (Fla. 1st DCA 
1977). 
58 See Pettigrew v. W & H Dev. Co., 122 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 2d DCA 1960). Although 
Pettigrew dealt with conversion of personal property, there is no reason to think that its 
description of personal property will not fit within the definition of personal property for 
partition purposes. 
59 See Beal Bank SSB v. Almand and Assocs., 780 So. 2d 45, 53-59 (Fla. 2001); Julia 
v. Russo, 984 So. 2d 1283, 1285 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008); Mercurio v. Urban, 552 So. 2d 
236, 237 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989); Lubarr v. Lubarr, 199 So. 2d 123, 125 (Fla. 3d DCA 
1967); Banfi v. Banfi, 123 So. 2d 52, 53 (Fla. 3d DCA 1960). 
60 Id.   
61 Beal Bank SSB, 780 So. 2d at 45. 
62 Id. at 53-59. 
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constitute personal property.63 Accordingly, jointly owned bank, 
brokerage, and securities accounts are subject to partition, division, and 
sale like real property if such property is indivisible and not subject to 
partition without prejudice to the others.64 If the property is divisible 
without prejudice to the owners, a partition in kind is justified and the 
property apportioned to the parties will be divided in accordance with the 
owners’ interests.65 
Bank, brokerage, and securities accounts are liquid, and the division 
should be simpler than for real property because there are fewer 
questions as to fair market value, credits, and setoffs,66 whereas in real 
property there may be divergent claims of fair market value, credits, and 
setoffs.67 To say the least, opposing claims by cotenants are often more 
complex and intertwined with how much a cotenant may receive when 
real property is divided and sold based upon payments of maintenance 
costs, imputed fair rental value, and ouster that can result in an increased 
equity to one side over another on account of one cotenant’s payments on 
the real property without contribution from the other cotenant.68 Bank, 
brokerage, and securities accounts jointly owned can be more easily 
divided than their real property counterpart.69 Corporate shares of 
publicly traded stocks should also provide minimal issues as they will 
have the names of the joint owners and the form of ownership stated on 
the corporate shares.70 One exception is in deciding and applying a 
marketability ownership interest discount of the fair market value of 
minority stock in a closely held corporation in an intra-party dispute that 
results in the ultimate division and buy-out or sale to a third party of a 
                                                                                                             
63 Id. 
64 See Marks v. Stein, 160 So. 3d 502, 507 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015); Blanchard v. 
Commonwealth Oil Co., 116 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 3d DCA 1959). 
65 See Schroeder v. Lawhon, 922 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006). 
66 See Mercurio v. Urban, 552 So. 2d 236, 237 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989); Banfi v. Banfi, 
123 So. 2d 52, 53 (Fla. 3d DCA 1960). 
67 See infra XII and XIII. 
68 Ouster and a claim for a setoff of fair rental against a cotenant’s reimbursement of 
maintenance expenses paid from the proceeds of a sale of the property are topics 
discussed later in this article. See infra XV. 
69 See Mercurio, 552 So. 2d at 237; Banfi, 123 So. 2d at 53. 
70 See Mercurio, 552 So. 2d at 237 (ruling that the donor was entitled to a “credit of 
$2,933.95 representing one-half of the expenses he incurred with respect to the stock 
certificate” transferred to the recipient. Thus, this district court decision suggests that 
joint owners in such personal property are treated no differently than cotenants in real 
property, and both are legally required to contribute their proportionate share of expenses 
while the owners are joint owners in the respective properties.). 
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proportionate share of stock or sale to the co-owner upon separation, 
retirement, or death.71 
A decision on whether something is personal property, as defined in 
Florida Statute Section 64.091, should be straightforward on account of 
the statute’s broad definition. However, in Wilson v. Wilson, there was a 
dispute in a probate proceeding involving what to do with the decedent’s 
ashes after cremation.72 A divorced couple could not agree on where to 
bury the ashes of their 23-year-old son, who was killed in an automobile 
accident.73 When the son died, he was single without any children, and 
he had no will or other specific inter-vivos instructions for the 
disposition of his body.74 His parents were co-personal representatives 
and sole beneficiaries of his estate; they agreed on having his body 
cremated but were unable to agree on what to do with his ashes.75 The 
father requested the court to order the ashes divided into two containers 
by the funeral home so that the ashes could be distributed to the parents 
in equal portions.76 The father petitioned the probate court to declare the 
ashes “property” and, therefore, partitioned between the former husband 
and his ex-wife as beneficiaries of the estate under the probate code.77 
The trial court found that ashes were not “property” and not subject to 
partition, and denied the father’s petition, because the ashes were not 
subject to ownership.78 The district court affirmed and held that the 
decedent’s ashes were not “property” under the probate code; therefore 
his ashes were not subject to partition in a dispute between the 
decedent’s mother, who wanted to bury decedent’s ashes in Florida, and 
the decedent’s father, who wanted to bury the ashes in a family burial 
plot in Georgia.79 The district court reasoned that ashes after cremation 
were not owned by anyone and that the next of kin only have a limited 
possessory right to the remains for disposition purposes.80 
                                                                                                             
71 See generally Zenichi Shishido, The Fair Value of Minority Stock in Closely Held 
Corporations, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 65 (1993); Boettcher v. IMC Mortg. Co., 871 So. 2d 
1047 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004); Erp v. Erp, 976 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008); Martin v. 
Marlin, 529 So. 2d 1174 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); Corlett, Killian, Hardeman v. Merritt, 478 
So. 2d 828 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); Biltmore Motor Corp. v. Roque, 291 So. 2d 114 (Fla. 3d 
DCA 1974). 






78 Id. at 1177. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 1177-78. 
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The rationale in Wilson is worthy of discussion. A decedent’s corpse 
is not an asset of the decedent’s estate after death, nor does a corpse pass 
to a decedent’s next of kin as an asset of the estate at common law.81 
There are no property rights in the remains of a decedent, as well; rather, 
there is a limited quasi-property right in a dead body for purposes of 
burial, sepulture, or such other disposition that is held by a personal 
representative.82 Accordingly, a beneficiary does not have a property 
right in a dead body and remains other than for the personal 
representative to follow the decedent’s inter-vivos written declaration.83 
The problem for the next of kin in Wilson was that the decedent did 
not have a written declaration that provided the next of kin with 
directions on what to do with his body and remains. If cremation was 
designated, the decedent could have provided his wishes to the next of 
kin, his parents, on what to do with his ashes by a written declaration; 
those wishes could have provided that one or both parents had the right 
to the ashes and to equally divide the ashes, or that the entirety of the 
ashes should be spread on land or sea.84 Assuming that a written 
declaration provided the decedent’s wishes, the parents would have been 
required to follow the decedent’s wishes. Hypothetically speaking, if the 
decedent in Wilson provided in a written declaration that he wanted both 
parents to equally divide his ashes and one parent refused to release one-
half of the ashes to the other, then the aggrieved parent could have filed 
an action in the probate court that could have included an action for 
                                                                                                             
81 Id. See also Crocker v. Pleasant, 778 So. 2d 978, 988 (Fla. 2001); Cohen v. 
Guardianship of Cohen, 896 So. 2d 950, 954 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (“[A] dead body is not 
properly viewable as property or assets . . . .”). 
82 Id. Wilson, 138 So. 3d at 1177-78; FLA. STAT. § 497.005 (2015). Commentators 
have suggested that a dead body constitutes a “quasi-property right.” See John T. Brooks 
& Jena L. Levin, May He Rest in Pieces?: Uncertainty in the laws governing the 
disposition of a loved one’s remains WEALTHMANAGEMENT.COM (Sept. 24, 2014), 
http://wealthmanagement.com/estate-planning/may-he-rest-pieces. As always, it is 
incumbent to have written directions that clearly express the intent of the decedent 
specifing what to do with a beneficiary’s body, organs, and ashes, so that there is a 
minimum amount of acrimony by the next of kin, or else a court will have to decide if 
there is no written declaration by the decedent. 
83 FLA. STAT. § 731.201(32) (2015) (provides: “‘[P]roperty” means both real and 
personal property or any interest in it and anything that may be the subject of 
ownership.”). FLA. STAT. § 497.005(39) (2015) (contains a list of “legally authorized” 
persons and their various priorities for what happens to the decedent’s body and remains.) 
For estate planners, a person has the right to designate what should be done with a body 
upon death, but for now neither probate nor intestate succession statutes govern what 
happens to the body of a decedent without written directions. See Wilson, 138 So. 3d 
1176; FLA. STAT. § 497.005. 
84 See FLA. STAT. § 497.005; Winter Haven Hosp., Inc. v. Liles, 148 So. 3d 507, 513-
14 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014); Kasmer v. Guardianship of Limner, 697 So. 2d 220 (Fla. 3d 
DCA 1997). 
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partition under Chapter 64 of the Florida Statutes because each parent 
would have been entitled to possession and ownership of the ashes, 
especially if this designation by the decedent had been stated in the 
decedent’s last will and testament.85 Thus, silence by the decedent placed 
the decision on what to do with the ashes onto acrimonious former 
spouses in what became a tug-of-war that ultimately wound up being 
decided by the court.86 Still, the rationale and ruling of the district court 
in Wilson should not be questioned as the ashes were neither an asset of 
the estate nor were they subject to partition without a written declaration 
by the decedent. Without a court order or the agreement of the next of 
kin, the ashes were not subject to an equal division by two acrimonious 
divorced parents without a written declaration or last will and testament 
by the decedent, who could have provided his wishes upon his death but 
failed to do so, thereby placing the burden of deciding what to do with 
the ashes upon the court. 
                                                                                                             
85 See Kasmer, 697 So. 2d 220. Florida Statute Section 731.201(32) provides: 
“‘Property’ means both real and personal property or any interest in it and anything that 
may be the subject of ownership.” FLA. STAT. § 731.201(32). (2015). Chapter 64 requires 
a right to possession and ownership of divisible or indivisible property. Ashes do not 
have a monetary value, so, in such a situation where there is a written declaration a trial 
court may be able to apportion to the parties their equal shares of the ashes, making them 
subject to partition as long as a written declaration states the decedent’s intention that 
both parents equally divide the ashes. FLA. STAT. § 64.051 (2015). 
86 Had there been an inter vivos or testamentary directive providing the next of kin 
with what to do with the remains upon cremation, then the personal representative would 
have been required to follow the decedent’s wishes. If cremation were the decedent’s 
wish, then the personal representative would have had to follow the decedent’s directives. 
If it was decedent’s wish to have his or her ashes equally divided between the parents, 
then, if one of the parents disagreed, the other could have filed a partition action in the 
probate court. If burial was directed, then burial is what must occur. In such an instance, 
the trial court in Wilson could have found that the ashes could be distributed in 
accordance with the decedent’s written directives. See FLA. STAT. § 497.005 (2015); 
Winter Haven Hosp., Inc., 148 So. 3d at 513-14; Kasmer, 697 So. 2d 220. Still, ashes are 
not personal property according to Wilson, and they are not subject to partition if the 
parties cannot agree on what to do if there is no written directive providing the next of 
kin with what to do with the remains upon cremation. Wilson, 138 So. 3d 1176. If the last 
will and testament provided that cremation was the decedent’s wish, and that both 
beneficiaries would equally divide the ashes, then the ashes could have been considered 
as personal property that were duly possessed and owned by the beneficiaries and subject 
to probate and partition. See Winter Haven Hosp, Inc., 148 So. 3d at 513-14; Kasmer, 697 
So. 2d 220. 
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V. TREATMENT OF A DEPOSIT AND DOWN PAYMENT WHEN PURCHASING 
JOINTLY TITLED REAL PROPERTY 
Where one cotenant makes a full down payment on the purchase of 
real property, the cotenant not making a down payment should be liable 
for one-half of the original down payment at the time of division and sale 
in a partition proceeding.87 There is an exception to this generally 
accepted rule, which requires that each cotenant pay his or her 
proportionate share of a down payment. In O’Donnell v. Marks, an 
unmarried couple closed upon a home that was purchased for $210,000.88 
The entire amount, including closing costs, was paid for by one party 
from his separate funds received from the exercise of his stock options.89 
At closing, the real property was deeded to both cotenants, jointly with 
right of survivorship.90 After taking title, one joint tenant incurred and 
paid for costs and expenses for improvements, repairs, insurance, and 
taxes thereafter in the approximate amount of $51,000.91 The trial court 
found that both individuals were joint and equal owners.92 Accordingly, 
each had an obligation to pay one-half of the purchase price at closing 
and for expenses incurred thereafter, leaving the payer with the entire 
interest in the home in the absence of the joint owner’s payment of one-
half toward the purchase price and expenses of the house.93 Because one 
party paid for the entire deposit and costs of the house, while the other 
co-owner paid for nothing, the trial court concluded that the paying party 
was entitled to the entire interest in the house upon partition and sale.94 
The rationale applied by the trial court appears logically correct because 
both parties are legally required to pay costs and expenses on the real 
property in accordance with their proportionate ownership interest under 
the law of partition and co-tenancy.95 
On appeal, the district court in O’Donnell determined that upon 
purchase, the paying party intended to gift to the other cotenant one-half 
of the interest in the home on account of the wording of the deed, which 
                                                                                                             
87 Bailey v. Parker, 492 So. 2d 1175, 1177 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). 







95 See Kelly v. Kelly, 583 So. 2d 667, 668 (Fla. 1991); McFall v. Trubey, 992 So. 2d 
867, 869 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008); Schroeder v. Lawhon, 922 So. 2d 285, 296 (Fla. 2d DCA 
2006); Hawkins v. Hawkins, 895 So. 2d 1155, 1156 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005); 
O’Donnell, 823 So. 2d at 199; Bermudez y Santos v. Bermudez y Santos, 773 So. 2d 568, 
570 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000); Burnett v. Burnett, 742 So. 2d 859, 861 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999). 
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provided that the parties were joint tenants with right of survivorship.96 
The district court concluded that when the payer took title to real 
property in his own name and another’s name at the time of purchase, 
even though the entirety of the purchase price was paid by one party at 
closing, there was an intention by the payer to make a beneficial gift of 
an undivided one-half interest in the property to the other cotenant in the 
absence of evidence of a different intention.97 On the other hand, the 
district court ruled that once they became joint owners, both were equally 
liable to pay the home’s mortgage, improvements, repairs, insurance, and 
taxes that are required according to the law of joint tenancies.98 
                                                                                                             
96 O’Donnell, 823 So. 2d at 199. 
97 Id.; Julia v. Russo, 984 So. 2d 1283 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008). 
98 When real or personal property is placed into joint names, the donee can argue that 
the purported donor intended a gift, which is difficult to refute by the purported donor. 
See Julia, 984 So. 2d at 1285; Varela v. Bernachea, 917 So. 2d 295, 298-99 (Fla. 3d DCA 
2005); Mercurio v. Urban, 552 So. 2d 236, 237 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989). The parties in 
O’Donnell were never married, but the rationale provided in Florida Statute Section 
61.075(6)(a)(2)-(3) may still apply, because for all real and personal property placed in 
both names during a marriage; Section 61.075(6)(a)(2)-(3) provides that all real and 
personal property held as tenants by the entireties shall be presumed to be a marital asset 
regardless of who contributed to the deposit. FLA. STAT. § 61.075(6)(a)(2)-(3) (2015) See 
Heim v. Heim, 712 So. 2d 1238, 1239 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); Archer v. Archer, 712 So. 2d 
1198, 1199-1200 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) (ruled that the conveyance of real property to both 
spouses as tenants by the entireties created a gift and could not be rebutted under the 
circumstances); Cattaneo v. Cattaneo, 803 So. 2d 889, 890-91 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) (ruled 
that the evidence in a brief marriage did not overcome the presumption that the husband 
intended to make a gift of the home that he titled jointly in both spouses’ names, even 
though he had used premarital assets to purchase the home, where the former husband 
acknowledged that he had the property jointly titled in case something happened to him 
and to demonstrate to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) that the marriage 
was not fraudulent. Methods that may be used to rebut a presumption of gift, however, 
can include: a written side agreement (no doubt this is the best method), placing certain 
language in the deed that qualifies the deed as not being a gift to a cotenant, how the 
property was used during the marriage or relationship, if the property was titled as tenants 
in common rather than tenants by the entirety or joint tenants with right of survivorship, 
or the execution and recordation of a promissory note and mortgage in favor of the 
lending party for 50 percent of the deposit as long as each party has separate counsel of 
his or her choice (another viable method). Of course, the result upon partition and sale 
could be simpler if both parties equally contributed to the down payment, but that may 
not occur as both parties do not necessarily enter into a relationship on equal financial 
footing.). While Florida Statute Section 61.075(6)(a)(2)-(3) applies to marriage, there is 
no reason to believe that the rationale will not apply equally to unmarried couples who 
place real and personal property into both names in the absence of clear and convincing 
evidence to the contrary. See Julia, 984 So. 2d at 1285. “In absence of evidence to the 
contrary, co-tenants are presumed to owe [sic] equal undivided interests.” In re Levy, 185 
B.R. 378, 381 (S.D. Bankr. Fla.1995). “[U]pon the death of a cotenant, the deceased 
cotenant’s interest in the property subject to the tenancy in common, passes to his or her 
heirs, and not to the surviving cotenant.” 12 FLA. JUR.2D Cotenancy and Partition § 4 
(1998). See, e.g., Reinhardt v. Diedricks, 439 So. 2d 936, (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). Taking 
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A proposition one takes from O’Donnell as it relates to an unmarried 
couple is that if the payer wants to ensure that the entirety of the payer’s 
full deposit toward the purchase of real property is a special equity or 
credit, then a written agreement signed by both parties providing that the 
entirety of the purchase price does not constitute a gift. The agreement 
should also provide that upon partition and sale, the non-paying party 
will be responsible to the payer for one-half of the down payment.99 As a 
rule, each cotenant is the owner of one-half of the real property. In order 
to refute any presumption of a gift at a future division and sale, a written 
agreement should be sufficient to negate any presumption of a gift if the 
payer contributes the entirety of the down payment toward the purchase 
price.100 If a written agreement is not possible, the payer should make the 
least possible down payment toward the purchase of the real property 
and obtain a long-term mortgage so that the outstanding balance of the 
mortgage is paid over a lengthy period of time. In the future, the payer 
can still argue that the small down payment was not a gift under the rule 
applicable to joint tenancies and partition because all owners are required 
to contribute equally in accordance with the ownership interest in the 
property.101 However, if the court determines that one-half of the entire 
down payment by the payer to be a gift, the amount lost to the cotenant 
would be de minimis, thereby resulting in a negligible one-half loss of 
the donor’s deposit without recoupment. Still, once the parties become 
cotenants upon purchase, both cotenants are required to contribute 
equally to the home’s mortgage, taxes, insurance, maintenance, and 
improvement until partition and sale.102 In either event, the district 
court’s rationale and ruling in O’Donnell is questionable and logically 
                                                                                                             
title to property in joint names creates a presumption of a gift that may be rebutted. 
Sullivan v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 230 So. 2d 18, 20 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969). See also 
O’Donnell, 823 So.2d at 198 (taking title as tenants in common is an “indication of an 
intention to make a beneficial gift of an undivided interest to the other party”); Mercurio, 
552 So. 2d at 237 (stocks owned as tenants in common entitles co-owner to presumption 
of gift).” Based on this precedent, it is incumbent on the practitioner to recommend to the 
client that he or she should protect the client’s interest with an agreement that ought to be 
executed well before closing rather than after for reasons known all too well by those 
parties who have unsuccessfully argued against a gift of a dwelling or financial account 
that was jointly titled in both cotenants’ names and remained jointly titled, until future 
litigation. 
99 See Arana v. Hutchison, 638 So. 2d 564, 565-66 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994); Carnes v. 
Harris, 256 So. 2d 237 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972); Carman v. Gunn, 198 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 2d 
DCA 1967). 
100 Id. 
101 See Kelly, 585 So. 2d at 668; McFall, 992 So. 2d at 869-70; Schroeder, 922 So. 2d 
at 296 ; Hawkins, 895 So. 2d at 1156; O’Donnell, 823 So. 2d at 199; Bermudez y Santos, 
773 So. 2d at 570; Burnett, 742 So. 2d at 861. 
102 Id. 
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inconsistent with Florida law. The decision contradicts a long line of 
cases that makes each party equally liable for costs incurred for each 
respective cotenant’s ownership interest in jointly owned property.103 
In future cases handled by the practitioner, should there be no written 
agreement, the trial court may enter a decision without regard as to what 
one or both of the parties may have intended had they executed a written 
agreement about the parties’ financial responsibility, property division, 
attendant credits and setoffs, and any children that were born or adopted 
during the relationship. Should there be no written agreement, cotenants 
are warned and reminded of the maxim, caveat emptor—“let the buyer 
beware.”104 Without a written agreement executed by the parties 
outlining the financial responsibility and ownership of joint owners, a 
future circuit court will decide the matter on its own when the matter 
would have been best determined by the parties themselves pursuant to a 
written agreement. 
VI. THE APPLICABILITY OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS TO PARTITION 
ACTIONS 
The statute of limitations will not bar a partition action because the 
statute is not applied to equity actions.105 In McFall v. Trubey,106 the 
district court ruled that an owner’s claim for credit was not subject to the 
four-year statute of limitations for an action to enforce an agreement not 
                                                                                                             
103 Kelly, 583 So. 2d at 668; McFall, 992 So. 2d at 869-70. 
104 “For centuries, caveat emptor (‘let the buyer beware’) was the applicable rule of law 
governing disputes arising from the sale of real property . . . Under this ancient doctrine, 
in the absence of an express agreement to the contrary, the seller of real property was not 
liable or responsible to the buyer for a defective condition in the real property that existed 
at the time, the seller transferred possession to the buyer . . . Essentially, a purchaser 
bought real property at his or her own risk . . . More specifically, this doctrine required 
the buyer to make his own inspection of the premises before the seller transferred 
possession and relieved the seller of any liability for defective conditions that existed at 
the time of transfer . . . The doctrine of caveat emptor assigned no duty to the seller to 
communicate to a buyer the existence of latent defects in the real property unless the 
seller, by act or implication, represented that such a defect did not exist.” Maronda 
Homes, Inc. of Fla. v. Lakeview Reserve Homeowners Ass’n, 127 So. 3d 1258, 1263 
(Fla. 2013). 
105 McFall, 992 So. 2d 867; see Bucacci v. Boutin, 933 So. 2d 580 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006); 
Inglis v. First Union Nat’l Bank, 797 So. 2d 26, 27-28 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001). Florida 
Statute Section 64.011 provides that the statute of limitations is not applied in chancery 
(equity) actions. FLA. STAT. §64.011 (2015). Florida Statute Section 95.11(6) was also 
considered as a possible defense against a late filed partition action in McFall, but the 
district court rejected the statute of limitations as a bar to a partition suit, because there is 
no legal action that is equivalent to a partition action. See McFall, 992 So. 2d at 869-70; 
FLA. STAT. §95.11(6) (2015). 
106 McFall, 992 So. 2d 867. 
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founded on a written instrument.107 Here, the property owner sought 
credit in a partition action for payment of a cotenant’s share of property 
expenses because the cotenant moved away from the area and stopped 
paying his share of the expenses in 1987.108 The owner filed suit in 2004 
and asked for credits for their payments of the cotenant’s share from 
1987 to 2004.109 The trial court limited reimbursement to expenses paid 
during the four years before the filing of the lawsuit in 2004, which was 
for amounts expended after February 2000, and also awarded 
prejudgment interest on that amount.110 The district court based its 
decision on the rule of law that all cotenants must pay for their share of 
property expenses in a tenancy in common in the absence of an 
agreement saying otherwise.111 The district court also suggested that 
mere inaction without more over a lengthy period of time should not bar 
a suit for partition on the grounds of laches.112 
VII. MAXIMIZING INTERESTS IN REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY 
PARTITION ACTIONS: IS THERE A WRITTEN AGREEMENT SETTING FORTH 
JOINT OBLIGATIONS AND HOW WILL THE PROPERTY BE DIVIDED AND/OR 
SOLD UPON SEPARATION? 
Lawsuits involving those who are unmarried and jointly own real 
and personal property may seek to separate their respective interests. 
When doing so, the individuals may find themselves entangled in a 
controversy about how the real and personal property should be 
divided.113 When parties become embroiled in their personal differences 
and seek to separate their respective interests from the other, each will 
attempt to maximize their share of real and personal property after any 
credits or setoffs applied in a “buy out” by one cotenant of another 
                                                                                                             
107 Id. at 869-70. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. 
110 The district court in McFall rejected an award of prejudgment interest because the 
amounts due to the payer were not damages, but rather they are credits to be awarded in 
the allocation of the impounded fund upon the sale of the home. “The . . . right to receive 
these credits did not arise until the properties were sold and the fund created.” McFall, 
992 So. 2d at 870. 
111 See Schroeder v. Lawhon, 922 So. 2d 285, 296 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006); Hawkins v. 
Hawkins, 895 So. 2d 1155, 1156 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005); O’Donnell v. Marks, 823 So. 2d 
197, 199 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002); Bermudez y Santos v. Bermudez y Santos, 773 So. 2d 
568, 570 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000); Burnett v. Burnett, 742 So. 2d 859, 861 (Fla. 2d DCA 
1999). 
112 McFall, 992 So. 2d at 869-70 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008). 
113 See Poe v. Estate of Levy, 411 So. 2d 253 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); Dietrich v. Winters, 
798 So. 2d 864 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001); Julia v. Russo, 984 So. 2d 1283 (Fla. 4th DCA 
2008). 
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cotenant’s interest in the property,114 or upon a private sale of the real 
and personal property to a third party.115 
If there is a domestic partnership agreement providing for financial 
living arrangements during the parties’ unmarried relationship, including 
the couple’s ownership share, maintenance, and expense responsibilities 
in real property,116 then the agreement can provide provisions for any 
division, credits, and setoffs in a future partition proceeding, assuming 
that the parties are unable to amicably divide their real property when 
they decide to go their separate ways.117 While such agreements have 
grown in eminence and stature and have become increasingly acceptable 
by a variety of persons of all ages, they remain the exception rather than 
the rule because these agreements have been marginalized economically, 
politically, and socially as family law and policy has been and still 
remains widely governed by traditional family ideologies.118 Most 
couples that become involved in unmarried personal relationships, as 
distinguished from business relationships, fail to see the need for a 
written agreement that will provide the rights and obligations of the 
parties.119 After the honeymoon period, the trials and tribulations of 
living together will occur and may result in the couple’s disharmony and 
breakup. The couple will either stay together and attempt to work out 
their differences or separate and leave the consequences of any jointly 
owned real and personal property to a decision by the court and its 
                                                                                                             
114 See Marks v. Stein, 160 So. 3d 502, 508-09 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015); Green v. Green, 16 
So. 3d 298 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009); Blackmon v. Blackmon, 969 So. 2d 426, 429-30 (Fla. 
1st DCA 2007).  
115 See Marks ,160 So. 3d at 503; Blackmon, 969 So. 2d at 429-30; Bucacci v. Boutin, 
933 So. 2d 580, 586 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006). 
116 See Bucacci, 933 So. 2d at 581-82; Forrest v. Ron, 821 So. 2d 1163 (Fla. 3d DCA 
2002); Dietrich, 798 So. 2d at 864; Posik v. Layton, 695 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997); 
Poe, 411 So. 2d 253. 
117 See Bucacci, 933 So. 2d at 581-82. 
118 See generally Wakeman v. Dixon, 921 So. 2d 669 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006); Deborah 
Zalesne, The Contractual Family: The Role of the Market in Shaping Family Formations 
and Rights, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1027 (2015); Linda J. Ravdin, Premarital Agreements 
and the Migratory Same-Sex Couple, 48 FAM. L. Q. 397 (2014). In light of Obergefell v. 
Hodges, the United States Supreme Court decided that the Constitution guarantees a right 
to same-sex marriage in all 50 states and has accorded same-sex marriage to universal 
acceptance in the entire country; only time will tell how swiftly the judicial decision will 
impact change to traditional family ideologies. Obergefell v. Hodges, No. 14-556, slip op. 
(U.S. June 26, 2015). 
119 See Heather Mahar, Why Are There So Few Prenuptial Agreements? HARV. L. SCH. 
JOHN M. OLIN CTR FOR L., ECON. AND BUS. DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES, Sept. 2003, 436; 
Brian H. Bix, Premarital Agreements in the ALI Principles of Family Dissolution, 8 
DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y, 231 (2001); Edward Stein, Looking Beyond Full 
Relationship Recognition for Couples Regardless of Sex: Abolition, Alternatives, and/or 
Functionalism, 28 L. & INEQ., 345 (2010). 
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application of the partition statute, assuming that no written agreement 
was entered into by the parties before they entered into a personal 
relationship and purchased real and personal property. Had each hired 
their own attorney to incorporate their wishes into an agreement on how 
to treat the property after it is purchased, they could have removed or 
limited the court’s discretion upon separation. There is also an additional 
concern about children who may be born out of wedlock, or what has 
been called the “new normal.”120 This can and will add stress and strain 
to the relationship and increase concerns over how to divide their real 
and personal property upon separation. In the absence of a written 
agreement, a circuit court will adjudicate property rights under Florida 
law on co-tenancies and partition if the parties are not married, and upon 
reaching a decision the court will provide findings of facts in its final 
judgment.121 
VIII. CONTRACTUAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS FOR ENTITLEMENT TO 
ATTORNEY FEES 
Attorney fees may be awarded by a trial court if there is a contractual 
or statutory provision to support entitlement to attorney fees.122 Two 
major concerns of an individual in a suit dividing jointly titled real and 
personal property are: 1) how much the litigation will cost, and 2) 
whether the law permits recoupment of attorney fees and costs against 
the opposing party. Thus, a significant issue in partitioning real and 
                                                                                                             
120 Jason DeParle & Sabrina Tavernise. For Women Under 30, Most Births Occur 
Outside Marriage, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/18/us/
for-women-under-30-most-births-occur-outside-marriage.html?_r=0. 
121 See Fernandez v. Yates, 145 So. 3d 141 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014); Cintron v. King, 961 
So. 2d 1010, 1013 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007). 
122 The legal precedent in this area of the law is reasonably clear. As the Florida 
Supreme Court has said, “[A]ttorney’s fees incurred while prosecuting or defending a 
claim are not recoverable in the absence of a statute or contractual agreement authorizing 
their recovery.” Bidon v. Dep’t of Prof’l Regulation, 596 So. 2d 450, 452 (Fla. 1992). In 
addition, this Court reaffirmed the general rule that “[u]nder Florida law, each party 
generally bears its own attorneys’ fees unless a contract or statute provides otherwise.” 
Pepper’s Steel & Alloys, Inc., 850 So. 2d 462, 465 (Fla. 2003); see also State Farm Fire 
& Cas. Co. v. Palma, 629 So. 2d 830, 832 (Fla. 1993) (“This Court has followed the 
‘American Rule’ that attorney’s fees may be awarded by a court only when authorized by 
statute or by agreement of the parties.”); Florida Patient’s Comp. Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 
2d 1145, 1148 (Fla. 1985) (recognizing that this Court has adopted “the ‘American Rule’ 
that attorney fees may be awarded by a court only when authorized by statute or by 
agreement of the parties.”); Kittel v. Kittel, 210 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1967) (“It is an 
elemental principle of law in this State that attorney’s fees may be awarded a prevailing 
party . . . (1) where authorized by contract; [and] (2) where authorized by a constitutional 
legislative enactment . . . .”). See also Price v. Tyler, 890 So. 2d 246, 250 (Fla. 2004). 
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personal property is what amount, if any, should be awarded in attorney 
fees to cotenants’ attorneys as a necessary component of partition after 
the attendant credits and setoffs are determined. If the parties have a 
domestic partnership or joint venture agreement outlining the financial 
responsibility of co-owners for ownership share, maintenance, and 
payment of expenses of real property, then the court can follow the terms 
of the agreement, including any relief for attorney fees should there be a 
provision for attorney fees in the agreement.123 If the parties do not have 
a written agreement setting forth their financial responsibility and 
entitlement to attorney fees between unmarried persons, not limited to 
same-sex couples living together,124 there is no agreement to provide 
guidelines to the court and the parties. 
A.  Florida Statute Section 64.081 provides a basis to award 
attorney fees in a partition action 
In disputes involving jointly owned real and personal property where 
there are no children born or adopted during the relationship, the only 
basis for an award of attorney fees is Florida Statute Section 64.081.125 
This statute is far from definitive, but it provides that a party seeking 
partition is entitled to attorney fees with the amount subject to the trial 
court’s discretion.126 Florida Statute Section 64.081 also suggests that 
attorneys’ fees may be awarded commensurate with legal services 
rendered and that are” of benefit to the partition.”127 Thus, attorneys’ fees 
may be awarded in actions prior to the partition proceeding, which 
establish and protect title and interest in property.128 
What is a court to do if parties cannot resolve their jointly titled real 
and personal property dispute that results in a partition action? In 
Fernandez-Fox vs. Reyes,129 the standard adopted for an award of 
                                                                                                             
123 Bucacci v. Boutin, 933 So. 2d 580, 581-82 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006). 
124 See Posik v. Layton, 695 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997); Poe v. Estate of Levy, 
411 So. 2d 253 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). 
125 FLA. STAT. § 64.081(2015); see Fernandez-Fox vs. Reyes, 79 So. 3d 895 (Fla. 5th 
DCA 2012); Robinson v. Barr, 133 So. 3d 599 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014). 
126 FLA. STAT. § 64.081(2015). 
127 See Diaz v. Sec. Union Title Ins. Co., 639 So. 2d 1004, 1006 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994). 
Attorneys’ fees may be awarded for actions prior to the partition proceeding, which 
establish and protect title and interest in property. Florida Statute Section 64.081 
provides: “Every party shall be bound by the judgment to pay a share of the costs, 
including attorneys’ fees to plaintiff’s or defendant’s attorneys or to each of them 
commensurate with their services rendered and of benefit to the partition, to be 
determined on equitable principles in proportion to the party’s interest.” FLA. STAT. 
§ 64.081(2015) (Emphasis added.). 
128 Id. 
129 Fernandez-Fox, 79 So. 3d 895. 
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attorney fees was broadly stated to be that parties who seek partition are 
entitled to attorney fees based upon: the service performed by counsel, 
the responsibility incurred, the nature of the services, the skill required, 
the circumstances under which services are rendered, the customary 
charges for like services, the amount involved in the partition suit, and 
the ability of litigants to respond.130 Thus, Fernandez-Fox held that an 
award of attorney fees is subject to equitable principles in proportion to 
the party’s interest, so that apportionment under the statute means that 
the “majority interest should bear the greater proportion of [attorney] 
fees awarded to his own attorney, as well as the minority interest 
similarly should bear a share of attorney fees in proportion to his or her 
interest.”131 
B. Chapter 742 can form a basis for an award of attorney fees 
Where a child is born or adopted outside of marriage, Chapter 742 of 
the Florida Statutes applies in an action for paternity, parental 
responsibility, time-sharing, and child support pursuant to Florida Statute 
Sections 742.045 and 742.031, which specifically provide for attorney 
fees, suit money, and costs if there is a child born or adopted during the 
relationship regardless of whether a pleading asserts partition in the same 
action.132 If there is jointly owned real and personal property that needs 
to be divided, then an action pursuant to Chapter 742 can be consolidated 
                                                                                                             
130 Id.; see Robinson, 133 So. 3d 599. 
131 Fernandez-Fox, 79 So. 3d at 897. If the trial court finds that in the final judgment 
for partition that partition is appropriate, then the trial court must necessarily find that 
attorney fees and costs are appropriate in accordance with the provisions of § 64.081. See 
Robinson, 133 So. 3d 599, 600. 
132 FLA. STAT. §§ 742.031, 742.045 (2015); Dietrich v. Winters, 798 So. 2d 864 (Fla. 
4th DCA 2001). In Carmenates v. Hernandez, the district court ruled that in a paternity, 
time sharing, and child support petition, attorney fees may be requested pursuant to 
§742.045. Carmenates v. Hernandez, 127 So. 3d 631 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013). However, the 
district court emphasized that: “A paternity action filed under chapter 742 is not to be 
utilized by formerly cohabiting individuals to determine issues relating to the division or 
ownership of property.” Carmenates, 127 So. 3d at 634. While the district court quashed 
counts asserting conversion and replevin without prejudice to filing a separate action, it 
did not discuss the propriety of consolidating a partition and paternity and child support 
action in the same complaint, which has occurred. Dietrich, 798 So. 2d at 865. Whether 
or not introducing a partition action into a paternity and child support action, or vice 
versa, would be prohibited, may be worthy of debate, but on account of their identity of 
parties, similarity of issues, and need for shelter by minors, there should be no reason 
why partition, paternity, time sharing, and child support cannot be joined into one 
complaint. 
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into an action under Chapter 64, which can provide for both an award of 
attorney fees and costs.133 
C.  Dissolution of Marriage and Florida Statute Section 61.16(1) 
for an award of attorney fees 
In a Dissolution of Marriage, the practitioner has the option to 
include a separate count for partition that is part of the same proceeding, 
assuming that the real property is in the name of both spouses, and, by 
doing so, a court may enter an award of attorney fees pursuant to Florida 
Statute Section 61.16(1).134 Where a practitioner files a Dissolution of 
Marriage in Count I and a Partition in Count II, the trial court has broad 
discretion in granting an award of attorney fees to the needier spouse for 
the entire proceeding,135 in equitably dividing the parties’ assets and 
liabilities, and in granting partition of real and personal property pursuant 
to Florida Statute Section 61.075.136 Where attorney fees are requested in 
a dissolution of marriage action, Florida Statute Section 61.16 provides 
that “after considering the financial resources of both parties,” the trial 
court may award the needier spouse attorney fees and costs based on a 
need and ability to pay standard that is founded upon the financial 
circumstances of the parties.137 In contrast, if a partition action involves 
unmarried persons in a civil action unrelated to Chapter 61 of the Florida 
Statutes and there are no children born or adopted in the unmarried 
relationship, rendering Chapter 742 of the Florida Statutes inapplicable, 
then only Florida Statute Section 64.081 will apply in the absence of a 
written agreement entered into by the co-owners that provides for 
attorney fees.138 
                                                                                                             
133 See Fla. Stat. § 64.081 (2015) (partition); Fla. Stat. §§ 742.045, 742.031 (2015) 
(paternity, parental responsibility, time-sharing, and child support). 
134 FLA. STAT. § 61.16(1) (2015). 
135 FLA. STAT. § 61.16 (2015). An often cited case is Rosen v. Rosen, where the Florida 
Supreme Court stated that in dissolution proceedings, the financial resources of the 
parties are the primary factor to be considered in an award of attorney fees to the needier 
spouse. However, other relevant circumstances to be considered include the scope and 
history of the litigation; the duration of the litigation; the merits of the respective 
positions; whether the litigation is brought or maintained primarily to harass; whether a 
defense is raised mainly to frustrate or stall; and the existence and course of prior or 
pending litigation. Rosen v. Rosen, 659 So. 2d 368 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (quashed in part, 
696 So. 2d 697, 703 (Fla. 1997)). 
136 FLA. STAT. § 61.075 (2015) (granting the trial court discretion in designing an 
equitable distribution plan in order to divide the parties’ real and personal property). 
Santiago v. Santiago, 51 So. 3d 637 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011); David v. David, 58 So. 3d 336 
(Fla. 5th DCA 2011); Guobaitis v. Sherrer, 18 So. 3d 28, 33 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009); Prest v. 
Tracy, 749 So. 2d 538 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). 
137 FLA. STAT. § 61.16 (2015). 
138 See Fernandez-Fox vs. Reyes, 79 So. 3d 895 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012). 
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D. Florida Statute Section 57.105 can be a basis to award attorney 
fees for claims and defenses where the party and/or his or her attorney 
knew or should have known that there was no basis in law or fact for 
claims or defenses 
Florida Statute Section 57.105 can be used as a basis to support 
attorney fees in favor of the party requesting partition of real and 
personal property should a cotenant fail or refuse to concur in a partition 
of real and personal property and entitlement to credits and setoffs one 
party is entitled to receive against the other.139 Florida Statute Section 
57.105 has been strictly construed so that the practitioner must follow the 
statute meticulously to obtain an award.140 If the statute is followed, and 
the facts and the law warrant an award, this statute is mandatory, not 
discretionary.141 Florida Statute Section 57.105 has been amended many 
times since 1999, making the frivolous standard more liberalized in favor 
of an award of attorney fees on “any claim or defense at any time during 
a civil proceeding or action in which the court finds that the losing party 
or the losing party’s attorney knew or should have known that a claim or 
defense when initially presented to the court or at any time before trial: 
(a) was not supported by the material facts necessary to establish the 
claim or defense; or (b) would not be supported by the application of 
then-existing law to those material facts.”142 
                                                                                                             
139 See Law v. Law, 163 So. 3d 553 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015) (finding that a law firm, which 
represented the husband in a mortgage-foreclosure action regarding the marital home and 
which intervened in a partition and divorce proceeding, had no legal basis to support its 
claim in the partition and divorce proceeding for proceeds of the foreclosure sale to pay 
the husband’s outstanding attorney fees, and thus the wife was entitled to attorney fees 
and costs as sanctions. The home was homestead property subject to protections afforded 
by the Florida constitution’s homestead provision, and the wife had protected the 
homestead interest despite not being a title holder where she did not waive that interest. 
The law firm continued to pursue a claim against the wife after escrowed funds from a 
partition sale were awarded solely to wife resulting in an award of attorney fees to the 
wife and against the law firm.). See also Ratigan v. Stone, 947 So. 2d 607 (Fla. 3d DCA 
2007) (finding that attorney’s fees were awarded as a sanction pursuant to Florida Statute 
Section 57.105, where the former husband was not forthright and candid about his 
financial affairs, failed to comply with discovery requests, and engaged in wrongdoing 
throughout the trial). 
140 See Matte v. Caplan, 140 So. 3d 686 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014). 
141 FLA. STAT. §57.105 (2015). (states that upon a finding that the party and/or his or 
her attorney knew or should have known that the claims made had no merit, an award of 
attorney fees is mandatory, not discretionary). See Law Offices of Lynn W. Martin v. 
Madson, 144 So. 3d 707 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014); Matte, 140 So. 3d 686; Martin Cnty. 
Conservation Alliance v. Martin Cnty., 73 So. 3d 856 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011); de Vaux v. 
Westwood Baptist Church, 953 So. 2d 677 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007). 
142 FLA. STAT. §57.105(1) (2015) (amended on many occasions since 1999. The 
legislature expanded § 57.105, and its authority to sanction litigants and their attorneys 
for frivolous litigation. Under the amended statute, a trial court can award a party its 
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IX. OTHER CAUSES OF ACTION CAN BE CONSOLIDATED WITH A 
PARTITION ACTION WHERE THE PARTIES OWN JOINTLY TITLED REAL 
PROPERTY 
If partition of real and personal property is a cause of action in a 
dispute among jointly titled property owners, should a practitioner plead 
alternative causes of action, or is partition an exclusive remedy? 
Litigants claiming that partition is ripe for consideration should consider 
making all viable claims in a consolidated complaint. Thus, it is 
permissible to file an action to quiet title, ejectment, and for adverse 
possession along with a partition count to establish the rightful owners of 
real property and then determine what should be done after title is 
determined.143 Florida Rules of Civil Procedure 1.110 (b) and (g) permit 
litigants’ practitioners to allege inconsistent and alternative causes of 
actions in a complaint as long as the facts and circumstances warrant a 
claim for relief.144 Counts that can be consolidated into the same cause of 
action with partition include: resulting trust, contribution, failure to pay 
his or her proportionate share of costs and expenses, reformation, fraud, 
constructive fraud, fraudulent inducement, constructive trust, adverse 
                                                                                                             
attorney fees and costs on “any claim or defense at any time during a civil proceeding” 
when the trial court finds that a litigant satisfies the statute’s provisions. The objective of 
the 1999 amendment was to reduce frivolous litigation and therefore decrease the cost 
imposed on the civil justice system and party litigants by expanding the remedies that 
were previously not available.). See Wendy’s of N.E. Fla., Inc., v. Vandergriff, 865 So. 
2d 520, 522-23 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003); Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Herron, 828 So. 2d 
414, 417 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). Courts have noted that as a result of the amendment, the 
bar for imposition of sanctions has been substantially reduced. See Mullins v. Kennelly, 
847 So. 2d 1151, 1154-55 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003); Weatherby Assocs., Inc. v. Ballack, 783 
So. 2d 1138, 1142 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). § 57.105 was amended again in 2002 to include 
a safe harbor provision which provides a “‘pleader a last clear chance to withdraw a 
frivolous claim or defense . . . or to reconsider a tactic taken primarily for the purpose of 
unreasonable delay’” that allows a claimant to withdraw a claim within 21 days of service 
of a motion for sanctions. See Bionetics Corp. v. Kenniasty, 69 So. 3d 943, 949 (Fla. 
2011) (internal citations omitted); Maxwell Bldg. Corp. v. Euro Concepts, LLC, 874 So. 
2d 709, 711 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004). Under the pre-1999 statute, § 57.105 required “a party 
to show a complete absence of a justiciable issue of fact or law” in the entire proceeding, 
not just one claim or count. Wendy’s of N.E. Florida, Inc., 865 So. 2d at 523; see 
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 828 So. 2d at 417. Under the current statute, a litigant can 
recover attorney fees for any claims or defenses that are unsupported or are frivolous 
during the onset of the litigation or after it is discovered in the future. See Wendy’s of 
N.E. Florida, Inc., 865 So. 2d at 523; Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 828 So.2d at 419. 
143 See McGriff v. Leonard, 83 Fla. 695 (Fla. 1922); McIntyre v. Parker, 77 Fla. 690 
(Fla. 1919); Terra Ceia Estates, et al. v. Taylor, 68 Fla. 261 (Fla. 1914). 
144 Rule 1.110(b) and (g) specifically provide that alternative and inconsistent claims of 
relief may be demanded in the same complaint. FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.110(b), (g). See 
DiChristopher v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 908 So. 2d 492 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005); Booker v. 
Sarasota, Inc., 707 So. 2d 886 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998); Johnson v. State Dept. of Health and 
Rehab. Servs., 695 So. 2d 927 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). 
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possession, conspiracy, tortious interference with a business relationship, 
special equity, equitable lien, breach of partnership agreement, equitable 
accounting, judicial dissolution, injunctive relief, quiet title, breach of 
contract, unjust enrichment, ejectment, and declaratory judgment.145 
Partition is not an exclusive remedy to compel division and sale of 
jointly owned real and personal property, although partition may be the 
principal way. “The goal of an action for partition . . . is to avoid the 
problems arising from common possession [and ownership] of the 
property, not to recover possession of the individual moiety.”146 On the 
other hand, the goal of many causes of action against a record title owner 
of real and personal property is to establish a party’s title to real and 
personal property where there is a question as to who actually owns the 
subject property.147 
X. PERSONAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE SERVICE OF PROCESS IN A PARTITION 
ACTION 
Jurisdiction is a significant event in any litigation. While it is always 
best to obtain personal service of process over a defendant, if personal 
service of process cannot be obtained over a defendant, service of 
                                                                                                             
145 See Pakonis v. Clark, 156 So. 3d 503 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014); Olesh v. Greenberg,138 
So. 3d 561 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014); Castetter v. Henderson, 113 So. 3d 153 (Fla. 5th DCA 
2013); Van Vorgue v. Rankin, 41 So. 3d 849 (Fla. 2010); Chastain v. Chastain, 119 So. 
3d 547 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013); Jones v. Pfaff, 77 So. 3d 884 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012); Flinn v. 
Flinn, 68 So. 3d 424 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011); First States Investors 3300, LLC v. Pheil, 52 
So. 3d 845 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011); Weiner v. Weiner, 37 So. 3d 395 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010); 
Sanders v. Gussin, 30 So. 3d 699 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010); TID Servs. Inc v. Dass, 65 So. 3d 
1 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010); Mueller v. Marks, 576 So. 2d 1337 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991); Inglis v. 
First Union Nat’l Bank, 797 So. 2d 26 (Fla.1st DCA 2001). 
146 Russell v. Stickney, 56 Fla. 569 (Fla. 1911); Diedricks v. Reinhardt, 466 So. 2d 375, 
377 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985). Moiety is seldom used today, but it can mean the one-half of 
anything, as if a testator bequeaths one moiety of his estate to A, and the other moiety to 
B, so that each shall take an equal part. Generally, this constitutes a reference to one-half 
interest in real property as can be the case with joint tenants holding moieties. Where a 
married couple holds property as tenancy by the entireties, each spouse is said to hold it 
“per tout,” which means that each spouse holds the total or the entirety rather than a 
share, moiety, or dividable part. Thus, property held by husband and wife as tenants by 
the entireties belongs to neither spouse individually, but rather each spouse owns the total 
sum or the whole. 
In a joint tenancy with right of survivorship, each person has only his 
or her own separate share (“per my”), which share is presumed to be 
equal for purposes of alienation; whereas, for purposes of 
survivorship, each joint tenant owns the whole (“per tout”), so that 
upon death the remainder of the estate goes to the survivor. 
See Beal Bank, SSB v. Almond and Assocs., 780 So. 2d 45, 53 (Fla. 2001). 
147 Beal Bank, SSB, 780 So. 2d at 54. 
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process by publication is the alternative way of obtaining jurisdiction 
over the real and personal property.148 Florida Statute Section 49.011 (3) 
provides that service of process by publication is permissible in an action 
to partition real and personal property, as long as the property is located 
“within the jurisdiction of the court.”149 Service of process by publication 
may be utilized in any case allowed by Florida Statute Section 49.021 
“upon any party, natural or corporate, known or unknown,” as long as 
the defendant cannot be found within Florida for the purpose of service 
of the summons.150 The rule permitting service of process by publication 
has strict requirements that must be followed before a court obtains 
jurisdiction over the property.151 If jurisdiction is challenged in the 
future, the burden rests upon the plaintiff to prove that diligent search 
and inquiry was in fact made and this burden must be met before 
obtaining a default judgment.152 Florida law requires that the attorney or 
plaintiff swear that there has been “diligent search and inquiry” to locate 
the defendant as evidenced by the return of non-service of the 
summons.153 Florida Statute Section 49.011 requires that the plaintiff or 
the attorney swear that to his or her knowledge and belief, the defendant 
has concealed himself or herself so that process cannot be personally 
served.154 Notice of the action can then be published.155 Form 1.924 of 
the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure requires considerable back-up and 
                                                                                                             
148 A fundamental requirement of due process of law in any judicial proceeding is 
notice; “reasonably calculated . . . to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the 
action” and to give the party so notified an opportunity to present his or her side of the 
controversy. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). Due 
process considerations take into account the need to serve a party by publication when the 
circumstances authorize it, but notice by publication is generally regarded as insufficient 
with respect to an individual whose name and address are known or easily determinable. 
Robinson v. Hanrahan, 409 U.S. 38, 39 (1972); Lorie v. Calderon, 982 So. 2d 1199, 1201 
(Fla. 3d DCA 2008). 
149 FLA. STAT. § 49.011(3) (2015); Miller v. Partin, 31 So. 3d 224, 227 (Fla. 5th DCA 
2010). 
150 FLA. STAT. §49.021 (2015). 
151 The constructive service statutes located in Chapter 49 of the Florida Statutes is 
strictly construed against the party who seeks to obtain service of process. See Martins v. 
Oaks Master Property Owners Ass’n, Inc., 159 So. 3d 142 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014); Estela v. 
Cavalcanti, 76 So. 3d 1054, 1055 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011). 
152 Martins, 159 So. 3d at 146. 
153 See FLA. STAT. §§ 49.031, 49.041, 49.051, 49.061, 49.071 (2015). 
154 FLA. STAT. §49.011 (2015). 
155 See FLA. STAT. §§ 49.021, 49.041 (2015). Pursuant to Florida Statute Section 
49.011, “[s]ervice of process by publication may be made in any court on any party . . . 
[t]o partition real or personal property within the jurisdiction of the court.” FLA. STAT. 
§ 49.011(3) (2015). 
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detail to substantiate the claim of diligent search and inquiry upon being 
challenged.156 
XI. “TILL DEATH DO US PART”: WHEN DOES JOINTLY TITLED PROPERTY 
VEST IN A COTENANT WHEN PARTITIONING REAL AND PERSONAL 
PROPERTY? 
Where title to property is in the name of both parties as tenants by 
the entireties—where the parties are married, or joint tenants with right 
of survivorship—where the parties are either married or unmarried, then 
both must survive the entry of a final judgment of partition before a 
cotenant’s proportionate share vests in each cotenant and each becomes a 
tenant in common. The district court in Mercurio v. Headrick considered 
whether a pending action to partition a joint tenancy with right of 
survivorship survives one joint tenant’s death during the pendency of the 
action.157 The district court in Mercurio held that such an action does not 
survive the death of a joint tenant with right of survivorship.158 Thus, 
absent entry of a final judgment of partition before a joint tenant’s death, 
the partition action is abated, and a surviving cotenant receives full title 
to the real or personal property consistent with the right of full 
survivorship.159 If one joint tenant with right of survivorship dies during 
the pendency of a partition action before the entry of a final judgment of 
partition, the interest of the deceased cotenant is automatically 
transferred to the remaining surviving cotenant.160 If there are three joint 
tenants with right of survivorship and one of them dies, each of the two 
remaining joint tenants ends up with a one-half share of the property. If 
there are four joint tenants who own real or personal property and one of 
them dies, each of the three remaining joint tenants ends up with a one-
third share of the property. In a joint tenancy with right of survivorship—
as distinguished from a tenancy in common—for purposes of 
survivorship, each joint tenant owns the entirety of the property, so that 
upon death of a cotenant, the remainder of the estate passes to the 
                                                                                                             
156 In 2010, the Florida Supreme Court substantially revised the form affidavit of 
diligent search and inquiry. In re Amendments to the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, 44 
So. 3d 555 (Fla. 2010). Form 1.924 requires considerable back-up and detail to 
demonstrate the claim of diligent search and inquiry. Id. If jurisdiction is challenged, the 
burden rests on the plaintiff, and therefore the plaintiff and the attorney should be 
prepared to meet its burden to prove that diligent search and inquiry was made. See 
Martins, 159 So. 3d at 1425-46; Estela, 76 So. 3d at 1055. 
157 Mercurio v. Headrick, 983 So. 2d 773, 774 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). 
158 Id. 
159 Id. 
160 See Beal Bank, SSB v. Almand & Assocs., 780 So. 2d 45, 53 (Fla. 2001). 
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surviving cotenant.161 In the creation of a joint tenancy with right of 
survivorship, each joint tenant must obtain equal shares of the property 
with the same deed, title, or other legally binding property ownership 
documents and it must be created at the beginning.162 For survivorship 
purposes, each joint tenant owns the entirety of the property so that upon 
death, the remainder of the estate passes to the surviving cotenant.163 A 
last will and testament will have no effect on a joint tenancy with right of 
survivorship, as each joint tenancy owns the entirety of the real 
property.164 
In a tenancy in common, each cotenant may have different 
ownership interests of the property as a whole.165 For example, A and B 
may each own one-quarter, whereas C may own one-half of the property 
as a whole. Tenants in common may be created at different times, but 
each cotenant owns a physically undivided part of each entire parcel. 
“Each may transfer his undivided . . . interest as he wishes so long as the 
transfer does not impair the possessory rights of the other tenant[s] in 
common.”166 Absent a last will and testament, no tenants in common 
have a right of survivorship with the other cotenants, and, accordingly, a 
deceased tenant in common’s interest belongs to his or her estate.167 
The entry of a Final Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage reserving 
jurisdiction to determine matters collateral to the adjudication of the 
dissolution retains jurisdiction to consider equitable distribution, attorney 
fees and costs, and other issues collateral to the Final Judgment of 
                                                                                                             
161 Id.; Sitomer v. Orlan, 660 So. 2d 1111, 1115 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). 
162 Id. 
163 See also FLA. STAT. § 689.15 (2015); Shakespeare v. Prince, 129 So. 3d 412, 414 
(Fla. 2d DCA 2014). 
164 Beal Bank, SSB, 780 So. 2d at 53; Morgan v. Cornell, 939 So. 2d 344, 346 (Fla. 2d 
DCA 2006). 
165 FLA. STAT. § 64.041 (2015); Starcher v. Starcher, 430 So. 2d 991, 992-93 (Fla. 4th 
DCA 1983). 
166 Morgan, 939 So. 2d at 346 (internal citations omitted); see also Davis v. Hinson, 67 
So. 3d 1107, 1110-11 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011). 
167 See Davis, 67 So. 3d at 1110-11 (“First, the deed was not signed by all of the owners 
of the encompassing 74-acre tract. It is undisputed that one of the original tenants in 
common died before the September 1989 deed was signed, leaving her interest in the 
property to her surviving children. One of her children—Rashunn Lewis—did not sign 
the deed. Traditionally, when tenants in common convey interest, they convey only their 
interest in the partial ownership of the complete parcel.”) (internal citations omitted). See 
Morgan, 939 So. 2d at 346; Elmore v. Elmore, 99 So. 2d 265, 266 (Fla. 1957) (“[O]ne 
cotenant cannot bind another, absent that other’s consent, by alienating any specific 
portion of the estate, since each cotenant owns an interest in the whole, which is 
indivisible except by partition or agreement.”) Therefore, a cotenant cannot convey 
exclusive possessory rights to a specific portion of their property unless every cotenant 
agrees to the conveyance. Id. See also Julia v. Russo, 984 So. 2d 1283 (Fla. 4th DCA 
2008); Reinhardt v. Diedricks, 439 So. 2d 936, 937 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). 
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Dissolution of Marriage, and therefore, those issues survive the death of 
a party and remain in family court. In King v. King,168 the district court 
ruled that the estate of the deceased former spouse should be substituted 
in the dissolution of marriage proceeding in place of the ex-husband 
where the trial court had “expressly retained jurisdiction” because the ex-
husband died only after entry of the Final Judgment of Dissolution of 
Marriage.169 Thus, it was reversible error to dismiss property issues in a 
dissolution of marriage proceeding where the trial court bifurcated the 
dissolution of marriage proceeding by the entry of a Final Judgment of 
Dissolution of Marriage because death of a party after entry of a Final 
Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage does not deprive the trial court of 
jurisdiction to determine issues reserved in family court.170 
On the other hand, a prejudgment mediation agreement or court 
order that merely provides that martial assets and debts will be divided 
equally while the dissolution of marriage is pending fails to survive a 
spouse’s death. In Marlowe v. Brown, the spouse died after the husband 
and wife entered into a prejudgment mediation agreement but before the 
entry of a Final Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage.171 Neither the 
agreement nor the order adopting the agreement set forth a plan or design 
of equitable distribution of assets and liabilities: it failed to specify which 
disputed parcels of real property were to be partitioned and sold; it failed 
to provide who would receive complete titles to parcels as part of an 
equitable distribution plan; and it failed to value assets or determine 
which party was entitled to them. Instead, the agreement that was 
incorporated into an order merely contemplated further discovery and 
negotiation and a subsequent Final Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage 
that would incorporate a future equitable distribution plan and design.172 
According to Marlowe, an interlocutory order in a dissolution of 
marriage proceeding does not survive the dismissal of a lawsuit when a 
spouse dies before entry of a Final Judgment of Dissolution of 
Marriage.173 
Even more compelling is Topol v. Polokoff, where, originally, a 
husband had his wife designated as a beneficiary of his individual 
retirement account (IRA), but re-designated his daughters as co-
beneficiaries of his IRA after a dissolution of marriage was filed but 
                                                                                                             
168 King v. King, 67 So. 3d 387 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011). 
169 Id. at 388-89. 
170 Fernandez v. Fernandez, 648 So. 2d 712, 714 (Fla. 1995); Claughton v. Claughton, 
393 So. 2d 1061, 1062 (Fla. 1980); Passamondi v. Passamondi, 130 So. 3d 736, 738-39 
(Fla. 2d DCA 2014). 
171 Marlowe v. Brown, 944 So.2d 1036 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006). 
172 Id. 
173 Id. at 1040. 
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before a Final Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage was entered.174 An 
interlocutory order was entered to maintain the status quo and that 
required him to re-designate his wife as a beneficiary, which he 
ultimately complied with.175 He died before the entry of a Final Judgment 
of Dissolution of Marriage.176 The district court held that the 
interlocutory order was temporary and not final; it was entered to 
preserve the status quo pending a Final Judgment of Dissolution of 
Marriage, but upon dismissal of the petition for dissolution of marriage, 
the agreement and interlocutory order re-designating the wife as an IRA 
beneficiary was a nullity that did not “survive the abatement” of the 
dissolution of marriage proceeding.177 
The practitioner should keep in mind that until July 1, 2012, 
beneficiary designations were not automatically changed upon the entry 
of a Final Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage. Florida appellate courts 
have addressed beneficiary designations for assets, such as life insurance 
policies, IRAs, deferred compensation funds, and other beneficiary-
designated assets by looking no further than the person named as 
beneficiary in the policy, plan, or account itself absent a marital 
settlement agreement providing who was to receive the death benefits of 
an asset or specifying who was to be the beneficiary.178 Before the 
enactment of Florida Statute Section 732.703, absent a change in the 
beneficiary form upon entry of a Final Judgment of Dissolution of 
Marriage that incorporated a marital settlement agreement, beneficiary 
designations were controlling.179 Life insurance companies and 
custodians of retirement plan assets do not generally tackle dissolution of 
marriage in their beneficiary designation forms regardless of the 
probable intent of the owner. Florida Statute Section 732.703 expands 
the automatic elimination of ex-spouses from their existing estate plans 
for beneficiary designations made by or on behalf of decedents who died 
                                                                                                             
174 Topol v. Polokoff, 88 So. 3d 341 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012). 
175 Id. 
176 Id. at 342. 
177 Id. at 343. 
178 For an excellent article outlining the change in the law, see Peter T. Kirkwood & 
Allison L. Kirkwood, Estate Planning: Death Soon After Divorce, 89 Fla. B. J. 33, 37 
(2015). 
179 Before enactment of Florida Statute Section 732.703, courts analyzed whether 
marital settlement agreements specifically provided who would or would not receive 
death benefits or would be the beneficiary of life insurance, and found general language 
in agreements insufficient to supersede plain language of beneficiary designations. FLA. 
STAT. § 732.703(2015). See Crawford v. Barker, 64 So. 3d 1246, 1248 (Fla. 2011); 
Cooper v. Muccitelli, 682 So. 2d 77, 79 (Fla. 1996); Smith v. Smith, 919 So. 2d 525, 527-
28 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005); Luscz v. Lavoie, 787 So. 2d 245, 247, 249 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). 
2015-2016] BREAKING UP IS HARD TO DO 115 
 
on or after July 1, 2012, regardless of the date of execution of the 
designation form, albeit with some caveats.180 
Will a final settlement stipulation, marital settlement agreement, or 
final mediation agreement providing details of resolution of a partition or 
dissolution of marriage action survive the death of a party? What if a 
spouse dies after the parties execute a marital settlement agreement or 
final mediation agreement that resolves all of the parties’ rights and 
obligations but before entry of a Final Judgment? As long as a settlement 
agreement is executed before the entry of a Final Judgment of 
Dissolution of Marriage or Final Judgment of Partition, and the 
settlement agreement fully resolves the property and support issues with 
finality, the final agreement should be enforceable.181 But there is a 
caveat to this statement. The appellate courts seem to emphasize that it is 
necessary to enter a Final Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage, and upon 
its entry, the remaining issues of the dissolution of marriage remain in 
                                                                                                             
180 FLA. STAT. § 732.703(2)(2015) (provides in pertinent part: “A designation made by 
or on behalf of the decedent providing for the payment or transfer at death of an interest 
in an asset to or for the benefit of the decedent’s former spouse is void as of the time the 
decedent’s marriage was judicially dissolved or declared invalid by court order prior to 
the decedent’s death, if the designation was made prior to the dissolution or court order. 
The decedent’s interest in the asset shall pass as if the decedent’s former spouse 
predeceased the decedent.”). The statute applies only to specific kinds of assets. See FLA. 
STAT. § 732.703(3)-(4) (2015). This law applies to a life insurance policy, qualified 
annuity, or other similar tax-deferred contracts held within employee benefit plans or 
outside such plans, employee benefit plans, IRAs, payable-on-death (POD) accounts, and 
security or other accounts registered in a transfer-on-death (TOD) form. See FLA. STAT. 
§§ 732.703(3)(a)-(f) (2015). The treatment of these types of assets was brought into 
conformity with wills and revocable trusts for Florida residents. FLA. STAT. § 732.507(2) 
(2015) (provides that upon the entry of a Dissolution of Marriage, a “will shall be 
administered and construed as if the former spouse had died at the time” of the Final 
Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage, unless the will or Final Judgment of Dissolution of 
Marriage expressly provides otherwise.). FLA. STAT. § 736.1105 (2015) (has the same 
effect on revocable trusts as the statute governing wills.). It provides that any provision of 
a revocable trust (which is executed by a husband or wife prior to Final Judgment of 
Dissolution of Marriage) that affects the settlor’s spouse becomes void upon a final 
Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage. Unless the revocable trust expressly provides 
otherwise, the trust shall be administered and construed as if the settlor’s spouse died on 
the date of the Final Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage. This statute does not apply to 
the extent that federal law provides otherwise. Thus, employer-sponsored, tax-qualified 
employee benefit accounts and plans, such as 401(k)s and other defined contribution 
plans are governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 
which supersedes any state statute or law that may relate to employee benefit plans. See 
Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 143-50 (2001). For an excellent article outlining the 
change in the law, see Peter T. Kirkwood & Allison L. Kirkwood, Estate Planning: 
Death Soon After Divorce, 89 Fla. B. J. 33, 37 (2015). 
181 See Passalino v. Protective Grp. Sec., Inc., 886 So. 2d 295, 297 (Fla. 4th DCA 
2004); Jonas v. Logan, 478 So. 2d 410, 411 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); Snow v. Mathews, 190 
So. 2d 50, 52 (Fla. 4th DCA 1966). 
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family court so that a judge may adjudicate those issues.182 Still, when 
parties execute a final mediation agreement or marital settlement 
agreement that divides the parties’ property and debts in an equitable 
distribution plan and design, awards attorney fees and costs, and 
determines entitlement to alimony as a lump sum or for a definite time 
period and that specifically provides that the settlement agreement’s 
provisions are final and survive the death of one or both spouses, then a 
final settlement agreement should survive the death of a spouse, even if 
there is no Final Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage entered.183 The 
same rationale should apply to a partition case, even if there is no Final 
Judgment of Partition as to a division of property entered before death, as 
long as the executed agreement provides that it is final and survives the 
death of the cotenants.184 To make certain that such an agreement is 
considered as a final agreement rather than an interlocutory agreement, it 
would be prudent to provide provisions in any final mediation agreement 
and marital settlement agreement that state: the terms of the final 
agreement survive the death of the parties, the agreement is final, and all 
rights and obligations are settled upon execution.185 In a dissolution of 
marriage case, if any alimony is periodic and ends upon the death of 
either party, then the agreement should specifically state that upon death 
of either party, there is no further alimony obligation.186 If an assessment 
of periodic alimony is to survive the death of either of the spouses and be 
a charge against the estate of the payer-decedent spouse, then the 
stipulated agreement should provide that those sums are due and owing 
by the estate for a definite time.187 Today, what is more likely and 
prudent in a final settlement agreement that is incorporated into a Final 
Judgment is a clause that requires a spouse to obtain a life insurance 
policy that will serve as a substitute for periodic alimony due and owing 
                                                                                                             
182 Florida appellate courts have ruled that the entry of a Final Judgment of Dissolution 
of Marriage reserving jurisdiction to determine matters collateral to the adjudication of 
the dissolution must retain jurisdiction to consider equitable distribution, attorney fees 
and costs, and other issues collateral to the Final Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage, 
and therefore those issues will survive the death of a party and remain in family court 
after the entry of a Final Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage. See Fernandez v. 
Fernandez, 648 So. 2d 712, 714 (Fla. 1995); Claughton v. Claughton, 393 So. 2d 1061, 
1062 (Fla. 1980); Passamondi v. Passamondi, 130 So. 3d 736, 738-39 (Fla. 2d DCA 
2014); King v. King, 67 So. 3d 387, 388, 389 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011). 
183 Passalino, 886 So. 2d at 297; Jonas, 478 So. 2d at 411; Snow, 190 So. 2d at 52. 
184 Id. 
185 Id. 
186 See Levine v. Horwitz, 67 So. 3d 1145, 1146-47 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011). 
187 See O’Malley v. Pan Am. Bank of Orlando, N.A., 384 So. 2d 1258, 1260 (Fla. 
1980). 
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at the time and in the future.188 Otherwise, if the latter language is not 
placed in the stipulated final agreement, the payer spouse’s personal 
representative may argue that only vested amounts of alimony and 
support are due and owing up to the date of death without future 
payments due and owing because the amount due only concerns vested 
amounts that are subject to a claim in an estate proceeding by the party 
who is purportedly owed the money by the decedent’s estate.189 When 
negotiating and writing a settlement agreement, be clear and specific to 
make certain that a prospective future judge will understand exactly what 
the parties meant when the final settlement agreement was executed 
should one of the parties die or have a change of heart and later believe 
that he or she entered into a bad bargain.190 
XII. DETERMINING SETOFFS AND CREDITS IN JOINTLY TITLED MARITAL 
RESIDENCE 
Florida Statute Section 61.077 provides that the trial court shall 
determine entitlement to setoffs and credits upon sale of a marital 
residence in a Final Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage.191 The statute 
provides: “A party is not entitled to any credits or setoffs upon the sale of 
the marital home unless the parties’ settlement agreement, final judgment 
of dissolution of marriage, or final judgment equitably distributing assets 
or debts specifically provides that certain credits or setoffs are allowed or 
given at the time of the sale.”192 There is no specific statutory provision 
that requires setoffs and credits in jointly titled real property for persons 
who are unmarried, yet Chapter 64 of the Florida Statutes and the law of 
jointly titled real property have been read to permit the assessment of 
credits and setoffs on jointly titled real property that are owned by 
unmarried cotenants.193 
Florida Statute Section 61.077 became effective on October 1, 1997, 
and its purpose was to compel trial courts to evaluate the statutory factors 
                                                                                                             
188 FLA. STAT. § 61.08 (3) (2015); see Sobelman v. Sobelman, 541 So. 2d 1153, 1153-
55 (Fla. 1989); Massam v. Massam, 993 So. 2d 1022, 1023-24 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008); 
Plichta v. Plichta, 899 So. 2d 1283, 1287 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005). 
189 See Blocker v. Ferguson, 47 So. 2d 694, 697 (Fla. 1950). 
190 See Ferguson v. Ferguson, 54 So. 3d 553, 555-57 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011). 
191 See FLA. STAT. § 61.077; Swergold v. Swergold, 82 So. 3d 1148, 1149-50 (Fla. 4th 
DCA 2012); Tuomey v. Tuomey, 74 So. 3d 583, 584 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011); Cardella-
Navarro v. Navarro, , on subsequent appeal 21 So. 3d 906 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009); Todd v. 
Todd, 734 So. 2d 537, 540-41 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). 
192 FLA. STAT. § 61.077 (2015). 
193 See McFall v. Trubey, 992 So. 2d 867, 870 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008); Schroeder v. 
Lawhon, 922 So. 2d 285, 293-94 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006); O’Donnell v. Marks, 823 So. 2d 
197, 199 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). 
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and determine which party should receive a setoff or credit in a Final 
Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage.194 The legislature believed that the 
receipt of setoffs and credits should not be deferred to a future date when 
the marital residence was sold.195 Finality is a necessary goal in any 
litigation, and former spouses need to know their respective financial 
responsibility regarding what is typically their main asset—the marital 
residence—in a dissolution of marriage proceeding.196 By enactment of 
Florida Statute Section 61.077, the legislature determined that if a trial 
court failed or refused to decide the matter of setoffs and credits as it 
pertains to the parties’ marital residence upon the entry of a Final 
Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage, the case should be reversed so that 
the trial court can decide the entitlement to setoffs and credits when the 
Final Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage is entered.197 Florida Statute 
Section 61.077 requires the trial court to determine the issue of setoffs 
and credits upon entry of a Final Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage, 
and accordingly the practitioner should present all available evidence and 
arguments concerning setoffs and credits at the final hearing in the 
dissolution of marriage proceeding, or else silence by counsel and the 
Final Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage could be deemed a waiver 
and res judicata.198 
Before enactment of Florida Statute Section 61.077, there was 
confusion about what and when courts could or would do as to setoffs 
and credits; therefore, it was not uncommon for a circuit court to defer 
ruling on the former spouses’ claims of setoffs and credits until a 
partition action was filed in the future.199 By deferring a decision on 
                                                                                                             
194 FLA. STAT. § 61.077 (2015). 
195 See Caine v. Caine, 152 So. 3d 860, 861-62 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014); Gonzalez Del 
Real v. Del Real, 139 So. 3d 442 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014); Swergold, 82 So. 3d at 1149-50; 
Tuomey, 74 So. 3d at 584; Silverman v. Silverman, 940 So. 2d 615, 618 (Fla. 2d DCA 
2006); Holitzner v. Holitzner, 920 So. 2d 827, 828 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006); Garcia v. 
Hernandez, 947 So. 2d 657, 661 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007). 
196 Barrow v. Barrow, 527 So. 2d 1373, 1377 (Fla. 1988) (“[I]t is in the best interests of 
all parties that property dispositions in matrimonial matters be concluded, if at all 
possible, in the dissolution proceedings, including a determination, if possible, of 
possession of any property held in a cotenancy.”). 
197 Swergold, 82 So. 3d at 1149-50; Tuomey, 74 So. 3d at 584; Cardella-Navarro, 992 
So. 2d at 858; Todd, 734 So. 2d at 540-41. 
198 FLA. STAT. § 61.077 (2015); see.Kelly v. Kelly, 583 So. 2d 667, 668 (Fla. 1991); 
Wolf v. Wolf, 979 So. 2d 1123, 1127 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008); Goins v. Goins, 762 So. 2d 
1049, 1050-51 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000); Goolsby v. Wiley, 547 So. 2d 227, 230 (Fla. 4th 
DCA 1989). 
199 FLA. STAT. § 61.077 (2015); see Robert M. Schwartz, The Bursting Bubble—
Dealing with the Marital Home During a Real Estate Recession, 83 FLA. B. J. 52 (2009); 
Goolsby, 547 So.2d at 230; Poole v. Savage, 525 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); Dugan 
v. Dugan, 498 So. 2d 989, 991-92 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Tinsley v. Tinsley, 490 So. 2d 
2015-2016] BREAKING UP IS HARD TO DO 119 
 
financial responsibility, the appellate courts placed the parties’ financial 
responsibility in a state of legal limbo upon entry of a Final Judgment of 
Dissolution of Marriage. The question of the parties’ financial 
responsibility became drawn out and remained unresolved, and there 
were questions about which former spouse would receive setoffs and 
credits in the future regarding the marital residence.200 By the time the 
case returned for a determination on the financial responsibility of the 
former spouses, there would likely be a newly assigned judge, who might 
have a different idea about what was fair and equitable depending on the 
existing financial circumstances of the parties.201 
XIII. BURDENS AND BENEFITS OF JOINTLY OWNED REAL PROPERTY BY 
COTENANTS 
If parties are married, then all real and personal property obtained 
during the marriage from marital efforts, labor, and funds is subject to 
equitable distribution regardless of the name the property has been 
titled.202 Partition is not an option for real and personal property titled in 
                                                                                                             
205, 207 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); Rutkin v. Rutkin, 345 So. 2d 400, 401-02 (Fla. 3d DCA 
1977); Whiteley v. Whiteley, 329 So. 2d 352, 353 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976). 
200 It was not unusual for some courts to permit a credit for mortgage principal 
reduction without interest, while others would allow a credit for the entire mortgage 
payment (principal, interest, taxes, and insurance). See Kelly, 583 So. 2d at 668. When a 
court grants a 50% credit for the entire mortgage payment, this includes an income tax 
deduction for the same payer cotenant for mortgage interest and taxes. Can this be 
considered a form of “double dipping” if the payer receives a 50% credit for the entire 
mortgage (principal, interest, taxes, and insurance) and an interest and real estate tax 
deduction from the IRS for the payment of interest and real estate taxes on the home? See 
Sell v. Sell, 928 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005); Buchman v. Canard, 926 So. 2d 390 
(Fla. 3d DCA 2005); Akers v. Akers, 582 So. 2d 1212 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). At a 
minimum, where courts permit both, the payer cotenant can be considered as receiving a 
double benefit. See Roth v. Roth, 973 So. 2d 580, 586 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008); Norman v. 
Farrow, 832 So. 2d 158 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). 
201 See Wertheimer v. Wertheimer, 487 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986) (ex-wife entitled 
to one-half of principal, interest, insurance, and taxes, even though there was some 
question whether only principal reduction should be granted as credit); Power v. Power, 
387 So. 2d 546 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980) (ex-spouse living in residence was entitled only to 
reimbursement for one-half of his payment of principal on mortgages and taxes); Iodice 
v. Scoville, 460 So. 2d 576 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984) (former husband was entitled to 
reimbursement for one-half of both principal and interest payments that he made on 
mortgage, but not his claim for expenditures for maintenance, repairs and improvements). 
202 FLA. STAT. § 61.075(6) (2015) (defines marital assets as those acquired during the 
marriage resulting from the efforts of either party or from the expenditure of marital 
funds). Scott v. Scott, 643 So. 2d 1124 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). A trial court must make 
specific findings regarding what property and liabilities are marital and nonmarital, and 
which party should receive each item as is required by Florida Statute Section 61.075(1). 
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only one name,203 and accordingly, a circuit court in a dissolution of 
marriage action is authorized to equitably distribute the marital assets 
and liabilities pursuant to Florida Statute Section 61.075.204 Jointly titled 
real and personal property held as tenants in common, tenants by the 
entireties, and joint tenancy with right of survivorship is also subject to 
equitable distribution in a Final Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage.205 
If one or both of the parties’ petitions contain a count for partition, then 
the real and personal property subject to partition should be divided or 
sold in the future upon the entry of a Final Judgment of Dissolution of 
Marriage.206 The practitioner should not overlook that, at the end of the 
dissolution of marriage proceeding, the trial court must determine which 
party is responsible for the mortgage—principal, interest, taxes, 
insurance; maintenance; preservation; and improvements. The trial court 
is also statutorily required to determine which party pays the mortgage 
and maintenance expenses and receives any setoffs and credits.207 The 
trial court is also required to make express findings regarding: fair 
market value of the dwelling; award of credits for amounts paid by one 
or both of the cotenants; fair market rental value of the dwelling that may 
be applied as a setoff against the cotenant’s claim for the payment of 
credits; and, if the trial court fails to do so, the district court is authorized 
to reverse and remand the case back to the trial court to make these 
express findings.208 
Regarding former spouses after entry of a Final Judgment of 
Dissolution of Marriage and unmarried cotenants, the rule applicable to 
jointly titled real property is as follows: (1) if one cotenant pays for the 
entirety of an obligation for which the owners are liable as joint tenants 
with right of survivorship or tenants in common outside of marriage, the 
paying party is entitled to have the other cotenant reimburse the paying 
party for his or her proportionate share of the expenses, which is one-half 
                                                                                                             
See Witt v. Witt, 74 So. 3d 1127 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011); Stewmon v. Stewmon, 66 So. 3d 
312 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011); Wagner v. Wagner, 61 So. 3d 1141 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011). 
203 FLA. STAT. §§ 64.031, 64.041 (2015); Dietrich v. Winters, 798 So. 2d 864, 866 (Fla. 
4th DCA 2001). 
204 FLA. STAT. § 61.075 (2015) (authorizes a circuit court to distribute marital property 
in an equitable distribution plan and design without the necessity of partition). See 
Durand v. Durand, 16 So. 3d 982, 984 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009); see Green v. Green, 16 So. 
3d 298 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009). 
205 Id. 
206 Id. Pantuso v. Pantuso, 335 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976); Brennan v. Brennan, 
122 So. 3d 923 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013); Gulledge v. Gulledge, 82 So. 3d 1113 (Fla. 2d 
DCA 2012). 
207 See FLA. STAT. § 61.077 (2015). 
208 See Kelly v. Kelly, 583 So. 2d 667 (Fla. 1991); Tuomey v. Tuomey, 74 So. 3d 583, 
584 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011); Burnett v. Burnett, 742 So. 2d 859, 861 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); 
Chaney v. Chaney, 619 So. 2d 440, 441 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993). 
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if there are two cotenants; and (2) co-owners must each contribute 
equally to the maintenance and preservation of jointly owned property in 
accordance with their ownership interest when they become tenants in 
common after marriage, or if they are joint tenants with right of 
survivorship if unmarried.209 Thus, when determining each of the parties’ 
credits and setoffs after they become tenants in common upon entry of a 
Final Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage, once the parties become 
single upon the entry of a Final Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage, or 
if they are cotenants and were not married to each other, then they are 
required to incur and pay their proportionate share of ownership 
expenses.210 
The same rule applies to any benefits of owning real property as 
cotenants. Where a cotenant leases the property to a third party and 
receives rent under a lease, the rent and other profits are deemed to be 
received for the benefit of all cotenants in proportion to their ownership 
interest.211 Where a cotenant in possession vacates the premises and rents 
the residence to a third party tenant, the rent benefits all cotenants in 
proportion to their ownership interest. If there are two record title 
owners, then one-half of the rent after expenses may be kept by the 
cotenant receiving the rent, while the other cotenant should receive one-
half of the rent after expenses.212 If there are three record title owners, 
then each cotenant is entitled to receive one-third of the rent after 
expenses, and each must pay one-third of the attendant maintenance and 
preservation expenses. Accordingly, each cotenant shares the burdens 
and benefits for their share of expenses and rent in accordance with their 
ownership interests. 
XIV. HOMESTEAD PROPERTY FROM FORCED SALE AND PARTITION 
Article X, Section 4(a) of the Florida Constitution provides that 
homestead property “shall be exempt from forced sale under process of 
                                                                                                             
209 See Kelly, 583 So. 2d at 668; McFall v. Trubey, 992 So. 2d 867, 869 (Fla. 2d DCA 
2008); Schroeder v. Lawhon, 922 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006); Hawkins v. Hawkins, 
895 So. 2d 1155, 1156 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005); O’Donnell v. Marks, 823 So. 2d 197, 199 
(Fla. 4th DCA 2002); Bermudez y Santos v. Bermudez y Santos, 773 So. 2d 568, 570 
(Fla. 3d DCA 2000); Burnett, 742 So. 2d at 861. 
210 See Joseph v. Estate of Joseph, 83 So. 3d 965 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012); McFall, 992 So. 
2d 867. 
211 Goolsby v. Wiley, 547 So. 2d 227 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989); Rosen v. Marlin, 486 So. 
2d 623, 627-28 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986). 
212 “A cotenant is accountable to the other cotenant for actual rent received from third 
parties. “Fischer v. Fischer, 503 So. 2d 399, 401 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987) (emphasis 
included); see also Hughes v. Krueger, 67 So. 3d 279, 282 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011) (internal 
citation omitted); Saleeby v. Potter, 295 So. 2d 130, 132 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974). 
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any court.”213 However, no Florida appellate court has ruled that the 
homestead provision of the Florida Constitution “precludes a common 
owner of property from suing for partition and obtaining a forced sale in 
order to obtain the beneficial enjoyment” of a cotenant’s interest in the 
property.214 Florida courts have consistently held that there is no claim 
for a homestead exemption from forced sale in a suit for partition by a 
cotenant whether that cotenant is a spouse or former spouse;215 realty 
investment company that purchased an undivided interest in the property 
from one of the other cotenants;216 or a former spouse and minor child 
who live on the subject real property, unless they live there pursuant to a 
court order that granted them exclusive use and occupancy during a 
child’s minority.217 The fact that marital real property is designated as 
homestead before, during, or after a Final Judgment of Dissolution of 
Marriage will not bar partition and sale of real property in favor of a 
cotenant.218 
XV. OUSTER OF ONE COTENANT BY ANOTHER OUT-OF-POSSESSION 
COTENANT: WHAT EFFECT DOES OUSTER HAVE ON SETOFFS AND CREDITS 
AS APPLIED TO JOINTLY TITLED REAL PROPERTY? 
The issue of ouster by one cotenant of another out-of-possession 
cotenant and whether upon ouster there might be a setoff of fair rental 
value to credits for payments made to preserve the real property are 
significant issues in partition. If a cotenant in possession seeks 
contribution for amounts paid toward preservation of real property, a 
joint owner may argue that one-half of the reimbursable household 
expenses paid by the cotenant in possession can be setoff by one-half of 
                                                                                                             
213 FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(a). 
214 See Tullis v. Tullis, 360 So. 2d 375, 377 (Fla. 1978); see DiGiorgio v. DiGiorgio, 48 
So. 3d 968 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010); Wescott v. Wescott, 487 So. 2d 1099, 1100 (Fla. 5th 
DCA 1986). 
215 Id. 
216 See Donly v. Metro. Realty & Inv. Co., 72 So. 178 (Fla. 1916); Black v. Miller, 219 
So. 2d 106 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969). 
217 Where a trial court grants exclusive use and occupancy to a former spouse during a 
child’s minority, it constitutes a form of support and what is in the child’s continued best 
interest, not homestead exemption, and the emancipation of the minor child is a changed 
circumstance which would divest the former spouse in possession of the right to 
continued exclusive possession. See Phillips v. Phillips, 83 So. 3d 903 (Fla. 2d DCA 
2012); Durand v. Durand, 16 So. 3d 982 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009); Sabin v. Butter, 522 So. 
2d 939, 940 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); Wiggins v. Wiggins, 415 So. 2d 861 (Fla. 5th DCA 
1982); Hoskin v. Hoskin, 329 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976). 
218 See Sell v. Sell, 949 So. 2d 1108, 1112 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (internal citation 
omitted); Partridge v. Partridge, 912 So. 2d 649, 650 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005). 
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the fair rental value of the property of an out-of-possession cotenant.219 
The leading case is Barrow v. Barrow, where a Final Judgment of 
Dissolution of Marriage made the husband and wife tenants in 
common.220 The former husband occupied the real property after the 
Final Judgment, even though the decree was silent as to who was entitled 
to its possession and the date of any future sale.221 The former wife 
petitioned for partition years later.222 The former husband made a claim 
for a one-half credit of the amounts expended to preserve and improve 
the property.223 The Florida Supreme Court held that when a cotenant in 
possession seeks a one-half contribution for amounts expended in the 
preservation of the property, the claim for a credit upon proof of 
household payments may be setoff by an out-of-possession cotenant of 
one-half for the fair rental value of the premises if the cotenant in 
possession holds the real property adversely against the out-of-
possession cotenant or as a result of ouster.224 
While the general principle in Barrow seems straightforward, 
applying it can be problematic. First, what does “ouster” mean, and 
second, how do Florida courts apply ouster to cotenants and their 
proportionate interest? Generally, the cotenant residing on the real 
property must do so adversely against the out-of-possession cotenant. 
Thus, a claim for a one-half credit upon proof of household payments in 
the preservation of the property by an in-possession cotenant may be 
setoff by an out-of-possession cotenant for one-half of the fair rental 
value of the premises upon ouster.225 Florida appellate court decisions 
have held that an ouster includes a claim of exclusive right or title by the 
in-possession cotenant that deprives all beneficial use of the property by 
the cotenant out-of-possession.226 Ouster also requires the cotenant in 
possession to directly or indirectly communicate to the cotenant out-of-
possession that he or she intends to deprive all beneficial use of his or her 
                                                                                                             
219 See Joseph v. Estate of Joseph, 83 So. 3d 965 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012); McFall v. 
Trubey, 992 So. 2d 867 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008). 




224 Id.; Joseph, 83 So. 3d 965; McFall, 992 So. 2d 867. 
225 Weiner v. Weiner, 37 So. 3d 395 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010); Goins v. Goins, 762 So. 2d 
1049 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000); Brisciano v. Byard, 615 So. 2d 213 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993); 
Adkins v. Adkins, 595 So. 2d 1032 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 558 So. 
2d 122 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). 
226 See Bailey v. Parker, 492 So. 2d 1175, 1177 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Vandergrift v. 
Buckley, 472 So. 2d 1325 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985). 
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property.227 If a final judgment is silent and one cotenant moves into the 
residence before the other, this does not constitute ouster.228 “[W]here 
exclusive possession by a cotenant is sanctioned by court order or 
agreement of the parties, there can be no offset (of one-half of the fair 
rental value of the property for the term of the lawful possession) against 
the claim” for a one-half reimbursement “for necessary and proper 
expenses incurred in the preservation and protection of the real 
property.”229 Thus, exclusive occupancy of the marital home by court 
order while the minor children reside there is considered to be a benefit, 
which bars the out-of-possession cotenant from receiving a one-half 
setoff of the fair rental value of the property.230 Where a cotenant merely 
files a petition for dissolution of marriage or complaint for partition, it is 
insufficient to constitute an ouster as neither cotenant is holding the real 
property adverse to the other cotenant’s right of possession.231 If a 
cotenant dies and the beneficiary obtains a non-adverse interest in the 
real property, such does not demonstrate the required adversity to 
constitute an ouster.232 Where exclusive possession by a cotenant is 
sanctioned by a court order or agreement of the parties, there can be no 
setoff of one-half of the fair rental value of the property for the term of 
the lawful possession against the claim of that cotenant for the 
reimbursement from the proceeds of a sale of the real property for one-
half of the necessary and proper expenses incurred in the preservation 
and protection of the property.233 
                                                                                                             
227 Coggan v. Coggan, 239 So. 2d 17, 19 (Fla. 1970); Atkinson v. Anderson, 77 So. 3d 
768, 770 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011); Patterson v. Patterson, 396 So. 2d 821, 822 (Fla. 4th DCA 
1981). 
228 Barrow, 527 So. 2d 1373. 
229 Goolsby v. Wiley, 547 So. 2d 227, 230 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989); see Kelly v. Kelly, 583 
So. 2d 667, 668 (Fla. 1991); Sweet v. Sweet, 993 So. 2d 91 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008); 
McCarthy v. McCarthy, 922 So. 2d 223, 226 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005); Brisciano, 615 So. 2d 
213; Fischer v. Fischer, 503 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987); Wood v. Friedman, 388 So. 
2d 1355 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980). 
230 Id. See also Babb v. Babb, 771 So. 2d 1215, 1217-18 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (“Charles 
is also correct that he was entitled to receive credit for one-half the rental value of the 
marital home from the time the youngest child reached age 18 until the time of sale. 
While Roseanne’s exclusive occupancy of the marital home was considered an aspect of 
child support, Charles was entitled to receive credit for one-half the rental value of 
marital home from the time his obligation for child support terminated; namely, the date 
the youngest child attained age 18. See Berger v. Berger, 559 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 5th DCA 
1990). Similarly, Roseanne was entitled to receive credit for one-half of all reasonable 
and necessary expenditures incurred by her for repairs and maintenance to the property. 
See Hernandez v. Hernandez, 645 So. 2d 171 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994).”). 
231 Diedricks v. Reinhardt, 466 So. 2d 375, 377 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985). 
232 Coggan, 239 So. 2d at 19; Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 558 So. 2d 122, 124-25 (Fla. 1st 
DCA 1990); Diedricks, 466 So. 2d at 377. 
233 Goolsby, 547 So. 2d at 230. 
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In light of the decision in Barrow and its progeny, a legal ouster 
must occur against an out-of-possession cotenant in order for him or her 
to claim one-half of the fair rental value as a setoff of one-half of the 
monies actually spent to preserve the real property by the in-house 
cotenant. In requiring a legal ouster to offset one-half of the fair rental 
value against one-half of the expenses paid to preserve the real property, 
the courts have followed the common law: possession and occupancy by 
one cotenant is “presumed to be possession” and occupancy by all 
cotenants, until the one in possession claims the right or title adversely 
against the out-of-possession cotenant. 234 In adopting this principle, it is 
apparent that courts have found a way to increase or decrease the equity 
of real property after considering each cotenant’s claims for setoff and 
credit as a way to provide a credit against the non-paying cotenant. If this 
were not the case, the cotenant who was not paying his or her share of 
the expenses upon sale would receive one-half of the net sale proceeds, 
which could include a substantial increment representing formerly 
unrealized appreciation in the value of the real property. Thus, the 
cotenant solely responsible for paying the mortgage, including principal, 
interest, taxes, and insurance, and maintenance costs will have directly 
increased the parties’ equity, thus protecting the investment from hazards 
and liens and will receive one-half of the net sales proceeds, less the sum 
of all such expenses. Such a result is inequitable unless there has been 
some prior consideration given for the disparity that can be verified.235 
This theory and analysis should also provide cotenants and their 
practitioners with a degree of predictability of what to expect if there is 
litigation in the legal system on the matter of ouster and their respective 
clients’ claims for a setoff and credit. 
If there is a voluntary retreat or relinquishment of possession of a 
residence by one cotenant without an ouster of a cotenant, there can be 
no one-half credit for the fair rental value to be set off toward one-half of 
the preservation expenses of the real property.236 In order to be entitled to 
a one-half fair rental value setoff by an out-of-possession cotenant 
against an in-house cotenant who has contributed preservation expenses 
toward the real property, there must be an ouster that is evidenced by: 
changing of the locks;237 actual or constructive eviction against a 
                                                                                                             
234 Id. at 229; Barrow v. Barrow, 527 So. 2d 1373, 1377 (Fla. 1988); Haas v. Haas, 552 
So. 2d 252, 254-55 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989). 
235 See Goolsby, 547 So. 2d at 228-29. 
236 Battista v. Battista, 585 So. 2d 459 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). 
237 Atkinson v. Anderson, 77 So. 3d 768 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011); Moraitis v. Galluzzo, 
511 So. 2d 427 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987); Bailey v. Parker, 492 So. 2d 1175, 1176 (Fla. 1st 
DCA 1986). 
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cotenant;238 rejection of a party’s demand to gain entry into the 
premises;239 demand letter setting forth that the party in possession is 
maintaining exclusive use and occupancy until sale;240 court order 
granting exclusive possession of the property due to a final judgment for 
protection against domestic violence as distinguished from a Final 
Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage awarding exclusive possession of a 
marital residence to one former spouse;241 or any act inconsistent with 
joint ownership by the party in possession with the cotenant out-of-
possession indicating that the out-of-possession party is no longer 
welcome.242 The legally described situations mentioned in this article and 
other similar future acts should be sufficient evidence of an ouster that 
will allow the out-of-possession cotenant to ask for and receive a one-
half setoff of the fair rental value of the real property during a period of 
exclusive possession of the residence by the cotenant in possession that 
can be setoff against the in-house cotenant’s one-half payment of 
preservation expenses. 
XVI. NONEXISTENT AND VOID AB INITIO MARRIAGES 
Legal chaos can result when couples act as if they are married, but it 
turns out that they are not married.243 If it is determined that the 
“husband” and “wife” were never legally married, then a void ab initio 
marriage places the parties in a position as if no marriage occurred 
regardless of what they thought or believed.244 Under these 
circumstances, one or both parties can still file a petition for dissolution 
of marriage and hope that they fall within the “good faith and in 
substantial compliance” test of Florida Statute Section 741.211 to 
support a lawful marriage.245 If it turns out that there was no lawful 
                                                                                                             
238 Wolf v. Wolf, 979 So. 2d 1123, 1127 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (internal citation 
omitted); Vandergrift v. Buckley, 472 So. 2d 1325 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985). 
239 Atkinson, 77 So. 3d 768. 
240 Joseph v. Estate of Joseph, 83 So. 3d 965 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012). 
241 Wolf, 979 So. 2d at 1126-28. 
242 See Atkinson, 77 So. 3d 768. 
243 See Nottingham v. Denison, 63 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 1953); William J. Cople III, CPLR 
314(1): Absent Minimum Contacts, Jurisdiction Lacking Over Nonresident Second Wife 
of Deceased Husband in Action by Domiciliary First Wife to Adjudicate Validity of First 
Marriage, 53 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 816 (2012). 
244 In re Estate of Seymour J. Kant, 272 So. 2d 153 (Fla. 1972); Preure v. Benhadj-
Djillali, 15 So. 3d 877 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009); Kittel v. Kittel, 194 So. 2d 640 (Fla. 3d 
DCA1967). 
245 See FLA. STAT. § 741.211 (2015); Hall v. Maal, 32 So. 3d 682 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010); 
Preure, 15 So. 3d 877; Metro. Dade Cnty. v. Shelton, 375 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 4th DCA 
1979); In re Estate of Litzky, 296 So. 2d 638 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974). Since 1967, when the 
Florida legislature abolished common law marriage, there has been only one way of 
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marriage, the parties still have the option to petition for paternity, time-
sharing, child support, and partition of real and personal property for any 
real and personal property that is in joint names of the parties. In 
Betemariam v. Said, the district court found that the parties’ marriage 
was merely a religious ceremony performed without a marriage license, 
and therefore, no legal marriage occurred.246 The parties had joint bank 
accounts and purchased a home, taking title jointly as husband and 
wife.247 The trial court entered a final judgment of paternity, time-
sharing, child support, and for partition of the residence, and ruled that 
the parties were never legally married; therefore, the court was without 
jurisdiction to enter equitable distribution or alimony awards.248 The 
district court affirmed the denial of alimony and equitable distribution as 
the trial court was without jurisdiction to consider those claims without a 
legal marriage, but it did sustain a final order as to partition, paternity, 
time-sharing, and child support.249 
Similarly, in Hall v. Maal, a year after the marriage ceremony, the 
parties appeared before the clerk of the court and applied for and 
received a marriage license.250  However, the license was neither 
solemnized nor returned to the clerk of the court to be made part of the 
official records of the county.251 In the years following the ceremony, 
two children were born of the relationship, the parties referred to each 
other as her “husband” and his “wife,” the “wife” was referred to as 
“Mrs.” in the workplace and elsewhere, the parties jointly purchased a 
home, and the mortgage on the parties’ home referred to them as 
“husband and wife.”252 Sometime later, the “wife” filed a petition for 
                                                                                                             
producing a legally cognizable marriage in Florida. See FLA. STAT. §§ 741.01–741.212 
(2015). Persons desiring to be married are required to apply for a marriage license, which 
can be “issued by a county court judge or clerk of the circuit court . . . .” FLA. STAT. 
§ 741.01(1) (2015). Hall, 32 So. 3d at 686 (“Florida’s marriage statute must be read in 
pari materia. Couples who desire to be married must apply for a license. There is a fee 
for getting a marriage license and that fee is reduced for attending pre-marital counseling. 
The license is valid for 60 days. The officiant at the ceremony must certify that the 
marriage was solemnized. The certified marriage license must be returned to the clerk or 
issuing judge within 10 days and the clerk or judge is required to keep a correct record of 
certified marriage licenses. Finally, there is a provision by which the marriage may be 
proved in instances where the license is lost or destroyed. At every turn in Chapter 741, 
marriages are presupposed to have a license. To depart from the requirement to have a 
license re-creates common-law marriage as abolished by section 741.211.”). 




250 Hall, 32 So. 3d 682. 
251 Id. 
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dissolution of marriage, and requested the usual claims that are part of a 
Dissolution of Marriage.253 The “husband” responded by filing an answer 
and counter-petition to establish paternity, but he denied the existence of 
a lawful marriage.254 The district court affirmed the trial court and found 
that a lawful marriage did not exist, but paternity was established along 
with shared parental responsibility, child support, primary residential 
custody of the children, and time-sharing.255 While no partition count 
was part of the proceeding, if the parties jointly owned a residence in 
both names, then either cotenant could have pled a partition count in 
these proceedings whether or not they were lawfully married. 
XVII. OBERGEFELL V. HODGES, 256 SAME-SEX MARRIAGE,257 AND 
PARTITION.  
“Marriage is one of the ‘basic civil rights of man,’ fundamental to 
our very existence and survival.”258 This principle was extended by the 
Supreme Court to same-sex marriage in Obergefell v. Hodges,259 where 
the Supreme Court decided that the Constitution guarantees a right to 
same-sex marriage in all 50 states, and by its ruling, the majority decided 
that same-sex marriage was accorded universal acceptance in the entire 
country.260 Thus, in its ruling, the Supreme Court resolved one of the 
great civil rights questions in a generation.261 The majority in Obergefell 
                                                                                                             
253 Id. 
254 Id. 
255 Id. at 687-88. 
256 Obergefell v. Hodges, No. 14-556, slip op. (U.S. June 26, 2015). 
257 For purposes of this article, “gay” and “same-sex” will be used interchangeably. 
Measuring sexual identity has presented challenges because it is a complex concept that 
is rooted in social and political frameworks that have been subject to change over time. 
See Randall L. Sell, Defining and Measuring Sexual Orientation: A Review, 26 ARCHIVES 
OF SEXUAL BEHAVIOR 643 (Dec. 1997). The majority in Obergefell recognized the 
transformation of homosexuality from being described as a” sickness” to a “normal 
expression of human sexuality and immutable” following substantial cultural and 
political developments where same-sex couples began to lead more open and public lives 
and to establish families. See Obergefell, No. 14-556, slip op. at 7-8 (U.S. June 26, 2015). 
258 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (citing Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 
535, 541 (1942)). 
259 Obergefell, No. 14-556, slip op. (U.S. June 26, 2015). 
260 Id. at 12-17, 19, 22-23, 27. 
261 Beginning in the 1970s, the debate over same-sex relationships and marriage raged 
on between advocates for both sides as to whether marriage is so fundamental as to 
constitute a federally guaranteed constitutional right rather than a right determined by 
each state. See The History of the Freedom to Marry in the United States, TIKI-TOKI 
(March 24, 2016) (retrieved March 24, 2016 from http://www.tiki-toki.com/timeline/entr
y/47611/The-History-of-the-Freedom-to-Marry-in-the-United-States/#vars!date=1972-01
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acknowledged the damage that can result to same-sex couples when they 
experience discrimination and intolerance by state and federal officials 
after voter referendums and legislative acts place those views into state 
constitutions and statutes.262 Tyranny of the majority has now become a 
myth that will not be tolerated by the states and the federal government 
when it comes to same-sex marriage.263 In relying on the Due Process 
and Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
Constitution, Justice Kennedy suggested that the founders provided the 
nation with a Constitution and a Bill of Rights without a specific 
blueprint for deciding what is or is not on the ultimate list.264 Justice 
Kennedy suggested that individuals’ liberties evolve over time and 
allows future generations to protect the right of all persons to enjoy 
liberty as the nation learns its meaning, and when that liberty has 
arguably been violated, the judiciary is called upon to address that 
claim.265 
According to Obergefell, lawful marriage includes traditional 
marriage between a man and a woman, as well as same-sex marriage in 
all 50 states, rather than allowing each state to decide whether same-sex 
marriage should be legalized in accordance with the viewpoints of voters 
and legislators in each state.266 While great deference was formerly 
placed on each state’s decision in the area of marriage,267 Obergefell 
                                                                                                             
-20_02:25:17!); William N. Eskridge Jr., A History of Same Sex Marriage, 79 VA. L. 
REV. 1419 (1993). 
262 Obergefell, No. 14-556, slip op. at 17-8 (U.S. June 26, 2015). 
263 Tyranny of the majority was extensively discussed by Tocqueville in Democracy in 
America. See Alexis De Tocqueville, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 235-264 (Harvey C. 
Mansfield & Delba Winthrop trans., The University of Chicago Press 2002) (1835). 
Tocqueville expressed great concern about the impact that tyranny of the majority can 
have on minority communities that has long been recognized as a danger inherent in 
governments built on democracy. See Id. He also emphasized the importance of marriage 
as the foundation of the family in America in this work. See Obergefell, No. 14-556, slip 
op. at 16 (U.S. June 26, 2015). For a thorough discussion of same-sex marriage and 
tyranny of the majority, see Harry M. Hipler, Tocqueville’s Slow and Steady Democratic 
Order in Light of US v. Windsor: Same Sex Marriage, and the Dilemma of Majority 
Tyranny, Federalism, and Equality of Conditions. (2013) (unpublished paper), available 
at http://works.bepress.com/harry_hipler/3. 
264 Obergefell, No. 14-556, slip op. at 17-23 (U.S. June 26, 2015). 
265 Id at 10-11, 24. 
266 Id. 
267 See U.S. v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972) 
(Minnesota Supreme Court ruled that a state law limiting marriage to persons of the 
opposite sex did not violate the U.S. Constitution. Baker appealed, and on October 10, 
1972, the U.S. Supreme Court dismissed the appeal “for want of a substantial federal 
question.”). Because the case came to the Supreme Court through mandatory appellate 
review, not certiorari, the dismissal constituted a decision on the merits and established 
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rejects a state’s right to define marriage as the union of one man and one 
woman, and the decision now prevents state governments from 
undermining gay marriage.268 
Florida may have been on the verge of deciding that the United 
States and Florida Constitutions guarantee a right to same-sex marriage 
in all 50 states. Before Obergefell, one district court in Florida, in 
Brandon-Thomas v. Brandon-Thomas,269 decided that Florida should be 
required to allow same-sex couples to dissolve their marriage, as long as 
they were legally licensed and performed out-of-state on account of the 
Full Faith and Credit clause of the United States Constitution.270 Another 
district court in Florida, in Oliver v. Stufflebeam,271 ruled that same-sex 
marriage and divorce was barred in Florida on account of the state statute 
and the Florida Constitution that barred same-sex marriage, and until 
there was a change in voter sentiment or the Supreme Court decided in 
favor of same-sex marriage, the district court was bound by the state of 
the law.272 After the Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell, lawful 
marriage includes traditional marriage between a man and a woman, as 
well as same-sex marriage in all 50 states. A legal and licensed marriage 
in one state will have to be recognized in all 50 states.273 
                                                                                                             
Baker v. Nelson as precedent, although the extent of its precedential effect has been 
subject to debate. 
268 See Obergefell, No. 14-556, slip op. at 27(U.S. June 26, 2015). From the beginning 
of the deliberation on the enactment of the U.S. Constitution, there has been a debate 
about political powers reserved for state governments (primacy of voters in referendums 
or of legislatures and their state representatives) as distinguished from the power of the 
U.S. Supreme Court to determine what may constitute a federally guaranteed 
constitutional right in the US Constitution and the Bill of Rights, especially the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and the Supremacy Clause in determining whether federal or 
state law controlled. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). Justice Scalia, in his 
dissenting opinion in Windsor, stated that the U.S. Supreme Court has no power to 
declare the law because the Constitution grants the people the power to govern 
themselves. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675. He echoes those views in his dissent. 
Obergefell, No. 14-556, slip op. at 1-9 (U.S. June 26, 2015) (Scalia, J, dissenting). The 
other side suggests that the U.S. Supreme Court has the power to decide whether there is 
a federally guaranteed constitutional right under the U.S. Constitution that overrides 
states’ decisions if the right is based on the Bill of Rights and any US Constitutional 
Amendments. See Obergefell, No. 14-556, slip op. (U.S. June 26, 2015). Those same 
fundamental questions were raised in Obergefell where the Supreme Court decided that 
the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited the 
States from barring same-sex couples to marry on the same terms accorded to couples of 
the opposite sex when it determined that marriage is a federally guaranteed constitutional 
right under the Constitution. Id. at 19-23. 
269 Brandon-Thomas v. Brandon-Thomas, 163 So. 3d 644 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015). 
270 Id. 
271 Oliver v. Stufflebeam, 155 So. 3d 395 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014). 
272 Id. 
273 Obergefell, No. 14-556, slip op. (U.S. June 26, 2015). 
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In Florida, what does the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in 
Obergefell mean for partitioning real and personal property of same-sex 
couples who marry and later file a petition for dissolution of marriage, or 
those couples who decide to remain unmarried and jointly own real and 
personal property? The short answer is that the full panoply of rights and 
obligations provided in Chapter 61 of the Florida Statutes and federal 
law of an estimated 1,138 marriage rights will apply to all married 
couples.274 The benefits and the burdens of marriage and dissolutions of 
marriage now apply to traditional and same-sex marriage. What has been 
lost in the historic same-sex marriage decision and jubilant celebration of 
it is the certainty of bitter break-ups and the difficulties that go with any 
dissolution of marriage and partition action where a couple decides to 
physically and emotionally break up. 
There is no reason to believe that the dissolution of marriage rate for 
same-sex marriages will not be comparable to the dissolution rate of 
traditional marriages. The nuts and bolts of any marital breakup, 
including but not limited to division of property and equitable 
distribution, partition, support and maintenance, time-sharing 
arrangements if there are children born or adopted during the marriage, 
and what constitutes marital and non-marital assets and liabilities will 
need to be resolved.275 Before couples decide to marry, they will have the 
option to obtain an antenuptial agreement as provided for in Florida 
Statute Section 61.079 should there be a future dissolution of marriage.276 
The same issues of law and fact that have applied to traditional marriage 
breakups between a man and a woman will now apply to same-sex 
marriage breakups as lawyers argue their respective clients’ cases to 
judges at trial if dissolutions cannot be amicably resolved. Equal dignity 
in the eyes of the law for same-sex marriage will apply to all married 
couples and to established tenets in Florida and elsewhere in the United 
States for same-sex dissolution of marriages. The system of laws that 
were once only applicable to marriage between a man and woman will 
now extend society’s tenets to all marriages and dissolution of marriage 
proceedings that carry both benefits and burdens to all married couples. 
For those same-sex couples who decide to remain unmarried, there is 
still a need for domestic partnership agreements between same-sex 
couples living together unmarried. By having a written agreement, 
                                                                                                             
274 See Overview of Federal Benefits Granted to Married Couples, HUMAN RIGHTS 
CAMPAIGN (2015), http://www.hrc.org/resources/entry/an-overview-of-federal-rights-and
-protections-granted-to-married-couples. 
275 FLA. STAT. § 61.075 (2015); Kaaa v. Kaaa, 58 So. 3d 867 (Fla. 2010); Stewmon v. 
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however, many of the challenges between same-sex couples may be 
alleviated and minimized should they decide to separate from each other 
in the future. Unmarried couples can provide each other and the court 
with guidance on what to do with real and personal property jointly titled 
if there is a written agreement. Without a written agreement, the parties 
will be subject to Chapter 64 of the Florida Statutes, in so far as partition 
actions are concerned and judicial decisions on credits, setoffs, and 
ouster. Each party will be subject to Florida law and a jurist’s sound 
discretion, and that decision may or may not follow what one or both 
parties intended when they purchased or received the real and personal 
property from the other years earlier.277 Obergefell, however, should 
have no impact on those same-sex couples who remain single, which has 
been the law in Florida for many years.278 
After Obergefell, same-sex couples should have four options: (1) 
before marriage, the couple can obtain an antenuptial agreement, setting 
forth their financial responsibilities, or they can marry without obtaining 
one; (2) the couple can remain single and rely on an existing domestic 
partnership and cohabitation agreement, or if none exists then each 
person can hire their own independent lawyer to prepare and review a 
proposed agreement so that same-sex couples can set forth their financial 
responsibilities to each other as to jointly titled property and living 
arrangements; (3) maintain the status quo and remain unmarried without 
executing a written agreement that will subject same-sex couples to 
Chapter 64 of the Florida Statutes, in so far as jointly owned real and 
personal property is concerned; (4) each party can own their separate and 
distinct real and personal property in their own name as a single person, 
and then upon a breakup without an amicable resolution, either can 
consider filing a civil action against the other for an equitable lien, 
special equity, and any other cause of action permitted under Florida law. 
We will just have to wait and see what happens in the future. 
XVIII. CONCLUSION 
Breaking up joint ownership of real and personal property through 
partition has significant consequences for married and unmarried joint 
owners with regard to a determination of each party’s proportionate 
ownership share, setoffs, and credits. Although cotenants have a 
                                                                                                             
277 See Sections VII, VIII, IX, supra. 
278 See Bucacci v. Boutin, 933 So. 2d 580 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006); Forrest v. Ron, 821 So. 
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fundamental right to partition in nearly all circumstances, it is always 
best for cotenants to agree amongst themselves by mediation or 
otherwise how to divide their jointly titled real and personal property due 
to the inherent risk that accompanies partition in civil litigation and 
dissolution of marriage when deciding issues of joint ownership of real 
and personal property and any attendant claims of setoff and credit. If 
settlement cannot be reached, cotenants and married couples chance the 
risk of allowing a judge to decide disputed issues in a contested 
dissolution of marriage and partition action that can be costly, time-
consuming, and disruptive. There is only a fixed amount of value that 
real and personal property may have, and absent settlement, there may 
only be a morsel for everyone if the litigated case is contested, because it 
is highly unlikely that either party will receive a windfall after costs. 
Whether real and personal property is jointly owned by a husband and 
wife, married or unmarried same-sex couples, two or more business 
partners or shareholders, or two or more unmarried coparceners, the 
chances are that there will be a dispute about dividing and selling jointly 
titled real and personal property and the attendant setoffs and credits that 
cotenants may be entitled to receive upon division and sale. Today’s 
lawyers will inevitably come in contact with disputes regarding joint 
ownership of real and personal property. 
This article has discussed many significant issues in partitioning real 
and personal property by married and unmarried couples if co-owners 
cannot settle their differences amicably. Florida law has attempted to 
prudently shape partition of jointly owned real and personal property in 
distinctive and characteristic ways. In light of the large number of joint 
owners of real and personal property,279 potential problems including the 
apparent risk posed by partition do not seem to have deterred the 
existence and growth of an abundance of joint owners knowing full well 
the risks that accompany joint ownership. Partition provides cotenants 
with an essential way to exit joint ownership for uncooperative joint 
owners who would otherwise find themselves hopelessly deadlocked and 
entangled together in joint ownership of real and personal property. 
Partition is a necessary breakout method designed to prevent joint 
ownership from becoming a padlock on the use and enjoyment of real 
and personal property by making it possible to transfer title and promote 
trade, commerce, and enterprise not only for co-owners but to society in 
general. There may be no easy way to divide and sell jointly owned real 
and personal property by unwilling co-owners who may be apt to 
antagonistically behave in ways that are not in their self-interest and 
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those of a cotenant. Such conduct will result in unreasonable restraints in 
the use and enjoyment of real and personal property making it impossible 
to sell and transfer title.280 Partition’s method, if successful, should 
ultimately end disagreement among co-owners by severing them from 
each other and their jointly owned real and personal property, so that real 
and personal property may be transferred and sold with each co-owner 
receiving an appropriate share of the net proceeds upon sale. 
                                                                                                             
280 See generally John C. Murray, Options and Related Rights with Respect to Real 
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